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TAx ABUSE ACCORDING TO WHOM?

by
Shannon Weeks McCormack'
ABSTRACT

Before 1996, the Internal Revenue Code presumed
that tax regulations applied to transactionsexecuted before
their enactment, giving the Treasury Department broad
authority to regulate retroactively. In 1996, however,
Congress reversed this presumption, requiring regulations
relating to Code sections enacted after 1996 to operate
prospectively. Congress also provided an important
exception in section 7805(b)(3), allowing tax regulationsto
apply retroactively "to prevent abuse. " Congress did not,
however, explicitly define abuse; nor did it designate to any
specific actor the power to do so. This Article provides a
comprehensive look at the level of deference reviewing
courts owe a Treasury Regulation's interpretationof section
7805(b)(3) 's abuse exception. Generally, an agency's
statutory interpretation is entitled to receive either the
strong standard of deference articulated in Chevron v.
Natural Resource Defense Council, or the lesser degree of
deference articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co. To date,

the courts reviewing retroactive tax regulations enacted to
prevent abuse have declined to apply Chevron deference,
relying on administrativelaw principles recently rejected by
the Supreme Court in Mayo Foundation v. United States.

This Article, therefore, provides a needed guide to future
courts by applying the post-Mayo deference framework to
Treasury Regulations that interpret section 7805(b)(3). This
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. I
especially thank Professors Kathryn Watts and Kristin Hickman for their comments
on this project. I also thank Professors Dorothy Brown, Ted Seto, and the
participants of the 2012 Critical Tax Workshop held at the University of Washington
School of Law, the Pittsburgh Tax Conference at the Pittsburgh School of Law in
March 2013, and the Critical Tax Conference at the University of California
Hastings College of the Law in April 2013 for their comments at various stages of
this project.
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Article concludes that, under this framework, a Treasury
Regulation's interpretation of section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse
exception should receive strong Chevron deference so long
as it is promulgated under proper administrative
procedures.
This analysis provides a significant contribution.
Through the issuance of retroactive regulations, Treasury
promotes the efficient enforcement of the tax laws and deters
egregious abuse. But case law suggests that the courts and
Treasury Department have very different interpretationsof
the Code's abuse exception. Therefore, the ability of
Treasury to respond to andprevent aggressive tax behavior
through retroactive tax regulation may turn largely on
which actorpossessesprimary authority to define tax abuse.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

If one were to tell an average taxpayer that the Treasury Department
possesses some power to issue tax laws that might affect the tax treatment of
transactions completed before those rules existed, one might expect that
taxpayer to act with a mixture of surprise and horror.' However, the Treasury
Department has long used retroactive regulations to prevent and respond to

1. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99

HARV. L. REV. 509 (1986) [hereinafter Kaplow, Economic Analysis of Transitions]
(acknowledging that there is "hostility towards retroactivity"); Michael J. Graetz,
Legal Transitions: The Case for Retroactivity in Tax Revisions, 126 U. PA. L. REV.

47, 49 (1977) [hereinafter Graetz, Legal Transitions] (explaining that "retroactivity
in tax legislation has been widely criticized"). See also Saul Levmore, The Casefor
Retroactive Taxation, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 265, 265 (1993) [hereinafter Levmore,

Retroactive Taxation] ("Retroactive taxation is generally regarded as unwise,

abhorrent or even illegal"); David W. Ball, Retroactive Application of Treasury

Rules and Regulations, 17 N.M. L. REV. 139, 139 (1987) [hereinafter Ball,
Retroactive Application] (describing retroactive lawmaking as "shocking" to
"notions of due process and fundamental fairness").
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egregious tax behavior2 and to foster the efficient3 and uniform
administration of the tax laws.4
Before 1996, the Internal Revenue Code presumed that tax
regulations applied to transactions executed before their enactment, giving
the Treasury Department broad authority to regulate retroactively.' In 1996,
Congress reversed this presumption in Code section 7805(b), requiring
regulations relating to Code sections enacted after 1996 to operate
prospectively.6 Congress also provided an exception to this general
requirement in section 7805(b)(3), allowing regulations to apply retroactively
"to prevent abuse." 7 Congress did not, however, explicitly define abuse; nor
did it designate to any specific actor the power to do so. It, therefore, left
open essential questions upon which this Article focuses: When the Treasury
Department issues a retroactive regulation under section 7805(b)(3), is that
regulation's interpretation of tax abuse entitled to deference? If so, what
level of deference should these interpretations receive?
The importance of these questions should not be underestimated.
Granting Treasury some power to issue retroactive regulations allows it to
police and prevent the most aggressive tax transactions. But case law
suggests that the courts and the Treasury Department have very different
interpretations of the Code's abuse exception. Therefore, the Treasury's
2. As argued by then-IRS Commissioner Fred Goldberg in hearings
discussed in Section III, infra: "If the IRS is precluded from asserting positions
retroactively in cases where taxpayers have taken questionable positions, the tax
system will lose an implicit restraint." See TaxpayerBill of Rights 2: Hearingson S.
2239 Before the Subcommittee on Private Retirement Plans and Oversight of the
Internal Revenue Service of the Committee on Finance, 102nd Cong. (1992)
[hereinafter 1992 TBOR 2 Hearings].

3. Scholars have eloquently argued that retroactive regulation may be more
efficient (or at least as efficient) as prospective rulemaking. See Kaplow, Economic
Analysis of Transitions, supra note 1, at 512 ("Generally, transitional relief is
inefficient because it insulates investors from the real effects of their decisions, and
thus distorts their behavior."); Graetz, Legal Transitions, supra note 1, at 73 (finding
that an analysis of "various efficiency criteria demonstrates that grandfathered rules
are not necessarily to be preferred in tax reform legislation."); Levmore, Retroactive
Taxation, supra note 1; but see generally Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions,
Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94
MICH. L. REv. 1129 (1996) (suggesting limits to the Graetz-Kaplow theory by
identifying a category of tax provisions that should not be modified retroactively).
4. As argued by IRS Commissioner Shirley Petersen in hearings discussed
in section II infra, a ban on retroactive regulations would "absolutely abolish
uniformity between the date of enactment of the statute and the date the regulations
are issued." 1992 TBOR 2 Hearings,supra note 2.
5. I.R.C. § 7805(b).
6. I.R.C. § 7805(b).
7. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3).
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ability to respond to and deter egregious tax behavior through retroactive tax
regulation may turn largely on which actor possesses primary authority to
define tax abuse.
To date, cases that have reviewed the validity of retroactive tax
regulations enacted to prevent abuse under section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse
exception have resulted in government defeat.' The courts reviewing these
regulations have declined to apply strong Chevron deference, relying on
administrative law principles recently rejected by the Supreme Court in
Mayo Foundation v. United States.9 In doing so, each court rejected the
government's arguments that "abuse" should be defined expansively for
purposes of section 7805(b)(3) in favor of its own narrow construction of the
term. This Article, therefore, provides a needed guide to future courts by
applying the post-Mayo deference framework to Treasury Regulations that
interpret section 7805(b)(3). Generally, an agency's statutory interpretation
(such as Treasury's interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code), is entitled
either to the strong standard of deference articulated in Chevron v. Natural
Resource Defense Councillo or the lesser degree of deference articulated in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co." After Mayo, Treasury's interpretations of the
Internal Revenue Code are entitled to Chevron deference, if they meet the
two-step test articulated in United States v. Mead Corp.12 (and are otherwise
entitled to deference under Skidmore). Mead instructs courts to first ask
whether Congress "delegated authority to the agency . . . to make rules

carrying the force of the law."13 In its 2013 decision, City of Arlington v.
Federal Communications Commission,14 the Supreme Court held that when
Congress delegates to an agency general authority to administer a particular
statute, it, has vested that agency with authority to make legally binding
rules.' 5 Because section 7805(a) authorizes Treasury to provide "all needful
rules and regulations" 6 necessary to enforce the Internal Revenue Code,
interpretations found in Treasury Regulations, including interpretations of

8. See infra section III.
9. 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).
10. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
11. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
12. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
13. Id. at 226-27. The "agency interpretation claiming deference" must also
be "promulgated in the exercise of that authority." Id. at 227.
14. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
15. Id. at 16 ("It suffices to decide this case that the preconditions to
deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has unambiguously vests
the FCC with general authority to administer the Communications Act through
rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue was promulgated
in the exercise of that authority.").
16. I.R.C. § 7805(a).

6
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section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception, would seem easily to pass Mead's first
hurdle.' 7
A Treasury Regulation's interpretation of section 7805(b)(3) will
therefore be eligible for strong Chevron deference so long as it is
"promulgated in the exercise of th[e] authority" granted in section 7805(a),18
Mead's second step. It is not entirely clear that Treasury's current method of
interpreting section 7805(b)(3) satisfies this requirement. When Treasury
interprets a provision of the Internal Revenue Code by issuing a regulation
pursuant to notice and comment or other formal adjudication procedures, it is
clear that Treasury has acted within the exercise of the general authority
granted in section 7805(a), and Chevron deference is warranted.19 However,
to date, Treasury has explained its reasons for making a particular regulation
retroactive under section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception in the preamble of
that regulation. When Treasury interprets a Code section in a preamble, is
that action exercising the general authority granted by Congress? While there
is no direct authority on this point, it would seem logical that these
interpretations would be Chevron eligible so long as they appear in the
preamble for the entire notice and comment period. Nevertheless, Treasury
might wish to avoid the ambiguity in the future by interpreting section
7805(b)(3) in separate regulations.
Having reached this conclusion, this Article illustrates how Chevron
deference should be applied to a Treasury Regulation's interpretation of
section 7805(b)(3). Chevron instructs courts to first ask whether "Congress
had spoken to the precise question at issue" 20 or whether Congress left an
ambiguity that it intended an agency to resolve (Chevron Step 1).2 1 In the
latter case, according to Chevron, a court should uphold that agency's
interpretation so long as it is a "permissible construction" 22 that is not
"arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute" 23 (Chevron Step
2).
Clearly, Treasury's power to issue retroactive regulations to "prevent
abuse" is an ambiguous one and when terms in a statute are ambiguous,
17. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
18. Id. at 227.
19. Mayo Found. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 704 (2011).
20. Id. at 842.
21. Id. See also United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct.
1836 (2012). The Supreme Court made clear that Chevron's first step seeks to solve
the "underlying interpretive problem of deciding whether or when a particular statute
in effect delegates to an agency the power to fill a gap, thereby implicitly taking
from a court the power to void a reasonable gap-filling interpretation." When a
statute is silent or ambiguous about the question addressed by the agency
interpretation, it is likely that Congress intended the agency to fill the statutory gap.
22. Id. at 844.
23. Id.
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courts generally conclude that Congress intended the relevant agency to
provide clarification. However, the powers granted in section 7805(b) are
purposefully limited and prohibit retroactive regulation unless certain
exceptions apply. It is therefore not clear whether Congress intended
Treasury to interpret the meaning of these exceptions, including section
7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception, or expected courts to play this role. To answer
this question, this Article considers the way in which section 7805(b)(3) fits
within the Internal Revenue Code, the legislative history of section
7805(b)(3), and the special expertise of the Treasury and Internal Revenue
Service, and ultimately concludes that Congress intended Treasury to
interpret section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception. As a result, a Treasury
Regulation's interpretation of section 7805(b)(3) will generally satisfy
Chevron Step 1.24
If it does, that interpretation will be upheld so long as it is not an
"arbitrary or capricious" construction of section 7805(b)(3) (Chevron Step
2).25 While this standard is high, it is not necessarily "insurmountable."2 6 For
instance, this Article argues that Courts should invalidate interpretations that
enact too great an alteration to current tax laws. 27
This Article proceeds in four parts. Section II explains the significant
role retroactive regulations play in curbing tax abuse and describes past and
current laws regarding retroactive tax regulations. Section III summarizes the
cases that have applied section 7805(b)(3) to review retroactive Treasury
Regulations. Section IV applies relevant deference doctrines to conclude that
a Treasury Regulation's interpretation of section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse
exception should be eligible to receive strong Chevron deference, so long as
it is enacted under proper procedures. Section V shows the way in which
Chevron's two-step test should be applied to regulations made retroactive to
"prevent abuse" under section 7805(b)(3).

24. As discussed in Section III, some courts might also look at whether
Congress unambiguously foreclosed a particular interpretation of section 7805(b)(3)
at Chevron Step 1. Other courts might reserve this inquiry for Chevron Step 2.
25. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
26. Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over "Fighting Regs" and Judicial
Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REv. 643, 697 (2012) [hereinafter

Lederman, FightingRegs] (citing Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 (2011)).
27. As discussed, this inquiry may fall either at Chevron step 1 or 2,
depending on the court. See infra Section III.
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PUTTING RETROACTIVE TREASURY REGULATIONS IN CONTEXT

The Signficance ofRetroactive Tax Regulations

Although the scope of this authority has changed over time, the
Treasury Department has long possessed some power to issue retroactive
regulations.28 Even before one becomes acquainted with the specific laws
governing this power, one might wonder whether Treasury should possess
any ability to issue regulations that apply to transactions completed prior to
their enactment. Scholars and lawmakers have engaged in considerable
debate about how to define the ideal boundaries of this power.29 Far less
controversial, however, is the need for Treasury to have some ability to use
retroactive regulations to respond to and deter egregious tax behavior.
Sophisticated taxpayers and their advisors are constantly engaged in
efforts to devise transactions that produce tax savings within the literal
meaning of the Internal Revenue Code but that are clearly not intended by
the tax laws.30 These transactions are extremely sophisticated and varied,
making it impossible to predict their occurrence ex ante.31 It is, therefore,
well understood that the tax laws cannot be adequately enforced through
traditional, forward-looking legislation alone.32 In response to this reality,
courts have developed several anti-abuse doctrines. For instance, under the
28. See I.R.C. § 7805(b) (creating presumption that Treasury Regulations
operate prospectively); compare I.R.C. § 7805(b) (creating opposite presumption).
29. See supra note 3.
30. See, e.g. Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters,

83 TAX NoTEs 1775, 1777 (June 21, 1999) ("The tax shelter, while supported by a
literal reading of the statute, regulation or case law produces a result that is
inconsistent with the commonly understood tax principles and is not supported by
clearly defined legislative intent").
31. See e.g. Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Essay, Tax
Shelters and the Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1951-52
(2005) ("Contemporary tax shelters are considerably more varied in design - and in

the Code provision they exploit - than were their predecessors."); Shannon Weeks
McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation:A Much Needed Purposive

Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. 697, 705 (2009) [hereinafter Weeks McCormack,
Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation] ("Lawmakers... cannot be expected to

predict today's abusive transactions before they occur because the complexity and
diversity of today's shelters prevents lawmakers from foreseeing the transactions").
32. James S. Eustice, Abusive CorporateTax Shelters, Old "Brine" in New
Bottles, 55 TAx L. REv. 135, 141 (2002) [hereinafter Eustice, Old "Brine" in New
Bottles] ("Even when Congress attempts to close down a perceived abuse, it
frequently comes late to the rescue, reacts with excessive overkill, and then repents
at leisure, if ever, only rarely returning to the scene of the accident."); Weeks
McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation, supra note 31, at 704-8
(discussing how lawmakers cannot handle the tax shelter problem alone).
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so-called economic substance doctrine, the tax savings associated with a
transaction will be disallowed if that transaction is not motivated by a
substantial non-tax purpose and did not meaningfully change the taxpayer's
economic position aside from the tax benefits claimed.33 These doctrines
operate retroactively by stripping taxpayers of the tax savings associated
with transactions completed prior to litigation.
But once a tax shelter scheme is devised, numerous taxpayers will
rush to mimic it, driven by the promise of large tax savings. If forced to rely
solely on the judicial anti-abuse doctrines, the Internal Revenue Service
would be required to litigate each of these transactions on a case-by-casebasis. In addition to being extremely costly and time-consuming, each court
will have its own opinion about whether and to what extent the tax savings
associated with a particular transaction should be disallowed.34 Retroactive
regulation, by contrast, can efficiently and uniformly respond to transactions
the Treasury believes to subvert the purposes of the tax laws.
In addition to policing tax abuse, providing Treasury the ability to
regulate retroactively can deter taxpayers from engaging in abusive
transactions in the first place by creating uncertainty and lowering the
expected profitability of these structures.3s Thus, retroactive regulation can
play an important role in the administration of the tax laws. With this in
mind, this Article now turns to the past and present laws governing the
ability of the Treasury Department to enact retroactive tax regulations.

33. The economic substance doctrine has recently been codified but is still
entrusted to the courts to administer. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1): "In the case of any
transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction
shall be treated as having economic substance only if-(A) the transaction changes
in a meaningful way (apart from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's
economic position, and (B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from
Federal income tax effects) for entering into such transaction."
34. For instance, numerous courts have considered similar versions of the
so-called "Son-of-Boss" transactions discussed in Section III, infra. See, e.g., Stobie
Creek Inv., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008) (analyzing "Son-of-BossTransaction"); See also Murfam Farms, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516
(2009); Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 2008); Klamath
Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex. 2006),
aff'd 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d
749 (7th Cir. 2008); Maguire Partners - Master Invs., LLC v. United States, 2009
WL 4907033 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
35. David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REV.
215, 249 (2002) (discussing the role uncertainty may play in deterring tax shelters);
Eustice, Old "Brine" in New Bottles, supra note 32, at 147 (". . . there highly

abusive transactions somehow have to be stopped, or at least seriously impeded and
if menacing ambiguity is the only way to do it, then do it we must.").

10
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Retroactive Tax Regulations: Pre-1996Law

Before 1996, section 7805(b) created a presumption that Treasury
Regulations would operate retroactively,36 allowing the Secretary of the
Treasury to use her discretion to determine whether a regulation should apply
prospectively, or also apply to previously executed transactions. While this
accorded the Treasury Department, of which the Internal Revenue Service
(the IRS) is part, rather wide latitude to choose the effective date of issued
regulations, there were some limits on the way in which this discretion could
be exercised. By 1996, the predominant standard38 used to review the
Treasury's "failure to limit a regulation to prospective application. ..
was
an "abuse of discretion" standard.40

36. See I.R.C. § 7805(b). "The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any, to
which any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be applied
without retroactive effect."
37. Id.
38. See Toni Robinson, Retroactivity: The Case for Better Regulations of
Federal Tax Regulations, 48 OHIO ST. L. J. 773, 784-93 (1987) (reviewing "older"

theories used to analyze whether regulations could properly be applied retroactively).
Professor Robinson writes: "Burdened by section 7805's approval of retroactivity,
the courts fashioned several other avenues for non-retroactivity, including the
doctrines of discrimination, legislative reenactment, and reliance." Id. at 784-85.
She, however, later writes that the Fifth Circuit's multi-factored test for "abuse of
discretion," discussed at note 46 infra, shows that "each of these other standards ...
is really part of abuse of discretion." Id. at 791. See also Ball, Retroactive
Application, supra note 1, at 147-48 discussing alternative "equitable estoppel"
arguments used to analyze retroactive regulations. This Article focuses on the "abuse
of discretion" standard because it is the standard most often used by courts
considering post-1996 cases under the pre-1996 version of § 7805(b). See, e.g.,
Amergen Energy Co., LLC ex rel. Exelon Generation Co., LLC v. United States, 94
Fed. Cl. 413 (2010) (using abuse of discretion standard); see also Ford Motor Co. v.
United States, 94 Fed. Cl. 211 (2010); Meserve Drilling Partners v. Commissioner,
1996-72, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2146 (1996), aff'd per curiam, 98-2 U.S.T.C. T 50,663
(9th Cir 1998); Democratic Leadership Council, Inc. v. United States, 542 F. Supp.
2d 63 (D.D.C. 2008); Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cire. 2012); CSX Corp. Inc. v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 341 (2003); Rice v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1488 (1999); Variety Club Tent No. 6 Charities,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 1485 (1997); Salmon Ranch, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, 647 F.3d 929 (10th Cir. 2011); Tate & Lyle, Inc. v. Commissioner,
87 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 1996). But see Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., Co. v. United
States, 61 Fed. Cl. 501 (2004) (analyzing whether the retroactive application of the
regulation violated due process); Howard E. Clenenden, Inc. v. Commissioner, 207
F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2000).
39. Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 F.3d 194, 202 (5th Cir. 1996)
("Although we have noted that regulations generally will have retroactive effect, the
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To apply this standard, a variety of factors were considered. For
instance, courts asked whether the retroactive application of the rule or
regulation would produce "inordinately harsh result[s]" 4' and/or raise
42
concerns of horizontal equity. Courts also inquired whether the taxpayer
was entitled to rely upon settled law reversed by the retroactive regulation,43
whether Congress implicitly acquiesced to that settled law through
reenactment" and/or whether the process of deciding to make the regulation
failure to limit a regulation to prospective application only is nevertheless reviewable
for abuse of discretion.").
40. See, e.g., id.; Anderson, Clayton & Co. v. United States, 562 F.2d 972
(5th Cir. 1977); Wendland v. Commissioner, 739 F.2d 580, 581 (1lth Cir. 1984)
("The decision to make a ruling or regulation retroactive will stand unless it
constitutes an abuse of discretion."); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S.
180, 185 (1957) (using "abuse of discretion" standard); see also LeCroy Research
Systems Corp. v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1984); Baker v. United
States, 748 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1984); Elkins v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 669 (1983).
See also Benjamin J. Cohen & Catherine A. Harrington, Is the Internal Revenue
Service Bound by Its Own Regulations and Rulings?, 51 TAx LAW. 675 (1998)
(discussing abuse of discretion standard).
41. Snap-Drape,98 F.3d at 202; Anderson, Clayton & Co., 562 F.2d at 981;
LeSavoy Found. v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1956); CWT Farms v.
Commissioner, 755 F.2d 790, 802 (7th Cir. 1986) (asking whether "change causes
the taxpayer to suffer inordinate harm.").
42. Snap-Drape,98 F.3d at 202; Anderson, Clayton & Co., 562 F.2d at 981;
Elkins v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 669 (1983) (rejecting taxpayer's assertion that the
retroactive amendments would "spawn unequal treatments among taxpayers."); IBM
Corp. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 357 (1965); Baker v. Commissioner, No. 912822, 1992 WL 104812 (7th Cir. 1992).
43. Chock Full 0' Nuts Corp. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir.
1971) ("A taxpayer, when acting in an area of unsettled law, has 'no vested interest
in a hypothetical decision in his favor prior to the advent of the regulations."') (citing
Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1971)); Redhouse v. Commissioner, 728 F.2d
1249 (9th Cir. 1984) (inquiring whether "taxpayer was.. .relying to his detriment on
settled law); Wedland v. Commissioner, 739 F. 2d 580 (11th Cir.1984) (finding that
there was no abuse of discretion because "taxpayers had notice of the impending
amendment [to the law]" and that amendment "did not change settled law.");
Anderson, Clayton & Co., 562 F.2d at 981 (asking "whether or to what extent the
taxpayer justifiably relied on settled prior law or policy and whether or to what
extent the putatively retroactive regulation alters the law."). See also Snap-Drape,98
F.3d at 381; CWT Farms, 755 F.2d at 802 ("[a]n abuse of discretion maybe found
where retroactive regulation alters settled prior law or policy upon which the
taxpayer justifiably relied and if the change causes the taxpayer to suffer inordinate
harm").
44. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 562 F.2d at 981. The Anderson, Clayton
court also asked "the extent, if any, to which the prior law or policy has been
implicitly approved by Congress, as by legislative reenactment of the pertinent Code
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operate retroactively was flawed.45 In 1977, the Fifth Circuit adopted a fivefactored test that essentially incorporated all of these elements.46 The test has
since been applied by other courts, though it is by no means universally
accepted.47
Regardless of how a particular court formulates the "abuse of
discretion" standard, it has generally been applied in a way that is deferential
to agency determinations,4 8 making it "... a difficult threshold for taxpayers
to surmount."4 9 In 1996, however, the Treasury's ability to regulate
retroactively was dramatically altered.

provisions." Id. See also Helvering v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110

(1939), which pre-dated the abuse of discretion test, and held that retroactive repeal
of law that Congress had implicitly authorized through reenactment was improper.
45. See, e.g., Chock Full O' Nuts Corp., 453 F.2d at 302 (stating that "The

Internal Revenue Service does not have carte blanche [to issue retroactive
regulations]. Its choice must be a rational one supported by relevant
considerations.") (citing IBM Corp., 170 Ct. Cl. 357). Pac. First Fed. Say. Bank v.
Commissioner, 101 T.C. 117, 128 (1993) (considering factors considered in
establishing retroactive effective date).
46. The Fifth Circuit proposed a multi-factored test to determine whether
retroactive application constitutes an abuse of discretion, first articulated in
Anderson, Clayton & Co. 562 F.2d at 981, and later used by other Fifth Circuit
courts, including Snap-Drape, Inc. v. Commissioner, 98 F.3d 194, 202 (5th Cir.
1996) and Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th C.
2009).
47. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Ball, Retroactive Application, supra note 1, at 142 (noting
generally "...courts have historically accorded extraordinary deference to the

discretion of the Commissioner under [the post-1996 version of] Section 7805(b)").
49. Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury's
(Lack of) Compliance With Administrative ProcedureAct Rulemaking Requirements,
76 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1153, 1193 (2008). For instance, in the often-cited case
Snap-Drape v. Commissioner, the court explicitly found that the "retroactive

application of [the] regulation [at issue]...produced inordinately harsh results" but
held that the Secretary had not abused his discretion because these results were not
"totally unforeseeab[le]." 98 F.3d at 203. This is not, of course, to imply that
taxpayers cannot be successful on their claims of abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Gehl
Co. v. Commissioner, 795 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that it was an abuse of
discretion to apply a regulation retroactively when Treasury Handbook had
"promised" to not change the law without further notice); see also IBM Corp. v.
United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 357 (1965) (holding that there was an abuse of discretion

when commissioner failed to retroactively apply favorable treatment provided in
competitor's Private Letter Ruling).
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Retroactive Tax Regulations: Post-1996Law

As part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, section 7805(b) was
changed to reverse the presumption that regulations would operate
retroactively.50 Specifically, the post-1996 version of section 7805(b)
provides that regulations relating to sections of the Internal Revenue Code
enacted after 1996" may not apply earlier than:
(A) the date on which [the] regulation was filed with the
Federal Register; (B) In the case of a final regulation, the
date on which any proposed or temporary regulation to
which such final regulation related was filed with the
Federal Register; or (C) The date on which any notice
substantially describing the expected contents of any
temporary, proposed or final regulation is issued to the
public.52
"New section 7805(b)" carves out several exceptions to this general
prohibition against retroactivity. Most of these exceptions are concretely
defined. For instance, the prohibition will not apply to "promptly issued
regulations," 53 defined as those "regulations filed or issued within 18 months
of the date.. .the statutory provision to which the regulation relates"5 4 was
enacted; or "when Congress has specifically authorized the Secretary to
prescribe the effective date ... [of a regulation];"5 5 nor will the prohibition
apply to "internal regulations" or regulations enacted to "prevent a
procedural defect."5
New section 7805(b)(3) includes a less defined exception, allowing
regulations to apply retroactively "to prevent abuse."" Section 7805(b)(3)
50. See Pub. L. 104-168, § 1101, 110 Stat. 1452, 1468 (codified in I.R.C. §
7805(b)).

51. See id. (stating "The amendment[s]... shall apply with respect to
regulations which relate to statutory provisions enacted on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act.").
52. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (2006). This section does not apply to rulings under
I.R.C. § 7805(b)(8) (2006), stating "The Secretary may prescribe the extent, if any,
to which any ruling (including any judicial decision or any administrative
determination other than by regulation) relating to the internal revenue laws shall be
applied without retroactive effect."
53. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(2).
54. Id.
55. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(6).

56. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(5).
57. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(4).
58. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3).
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does not provide a definition of abuse and its legislative history does not
elaborate further.59 The Joint Committee Report adds little, stating only that
the "abuse" to which section 7805(b)(3) refers is "abuse of the statute."o
By failing to expressly define abuse or designate to a specific actor
the power to do so, Congress left open essential questions regarding the
administration of new section 7805(b). As discussed below, the cases which
have reviewed the validity of retroactive tax regulations enacted to prevent
abuse under section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception have resulted in
government defeat.
III.

THE NEW RETROACTIVITY CASES

Since July 30, 1996, there are six cases which resolve the issue of
whether a regulation can be applied retroactively under new section
7805(b)6 1 and only three of these cases engage in any substantial discussion

59. See, e.g., Murfam Farms, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516, 526
(2009) ("Unfortunately, 'abuse' is not defined by the statute."). See United States
Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment as to the Validity of Treasury Regulation 1.752-6 referring to
"Court Order dated September 25, 2008, Murfam Farms, 2010 WL 3260167
(Fed.Cl. Aug 16, 2010), No. 1:06-cv-00245-EJD" at 14 [hereinafter United States
Supplemental Memorandum Responding to Court Order] ("Neither Section
7805(b)(3) or it legislative history define the word abuse."). See Sala v. United
States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1201 (D. Colo. 2008) ("The question of what
constitutes "abuse" is not clarified by the statute.") (citing Edward A. Morse,
Reflections on the Rule ofLaw and "ClearReflection ofIncome:" What Constrains
Discretion?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 445, 488 (1999) ("The scope of this

exception is unclear and it remains to be seen whether it will be exercised
independently of Congress' power to authorize retroactive regulations.")).
60. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., BACKGROUND
AND INFORMATION RELATING TO THE TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS 22 (Comm. Print
1995).

61. In order to reach this conclusion, six searches were run, using Westlaw
databases: SCT, CTA, DCT, ALLFEDS. The searches were as follows: Search 1:
"26 U.S.C. s 7805" & Dates between 1995- 2013; Search 2: "26 U.S.C.A. s 7805" &
Dates between 1995-2013; Search 3: "26 U.S.C. s 7805(b)" & Dates between 19952013; Search 4: "26 U.S.C.A. s 7805(b)" & Dates between 1995-2013; Search 5:
"Internal Revenue Code" & "7805(b)" & Dates between 1995-2013; Search 6:
"Tax!" & "7805(b)" & Dates between 1995-2013. Out of 193 cases produced in this
search, 30 cases were coded as resolving the issue of whether a regulation could
operate retroactively. Retroactivity was considered a resolved issue only if both a)
the court found that the challenged regulation or ruling operated retroactively to
affect the taxpayer and b) the court made a specific holding as to whether such
retroactive application was valid. Twenty-three of these cases resolved the issue
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of section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception. These cases deal with the more
specific issue of whether Treasury Regulation section 1.752-6 ("Regulation
section 1.752-6") can be applied retroactively to disallow the tax savings
claimed by taxpayers engaged in various versions of the notorious Son-ofBoss tax shelter transactions.
The fact that so few cases discuss section 7805(b)(3) underscores
rather than minimizes that section's importance. As discussed in Section
I.A., granting Treasury the ability to regulate retroactively can serve to police
and prevent the most aggressive tax planning. The relative scarcity of cases
suggests that the Treasury Department uses this power sparingly. But as the
facts of these cases also suggest, when that power is exercised, it is used to
respond to extremely egregious transactions that seek to subvert the purposes
of the tax laws. In the absence of retroactive regulation, each of these
transactions must be litigated on a case-by-case basis, resulting in
(sometimes extreme) judicial inefficiency.
A.

BackgroundInformation: RetroactiveRegulation 1.752-6

In order to understand Regulation 1.752-6, it is helpful to first
understand the transaction that led to its enactment. The transaction at issue
in Coltec Industries,Inc. v. United States64 provides a useful example. In that
case, Coltec, through its subsidiaries, created a new corporation ("Newco")
to which it transferred non-business assets worth $379.2 million. 5 Coltec did
not transfer any business assets to Newco. Newco, however, did assume
$375 million worth of contingent asbestos liabilities (i.e. liabilities whose
amount had not yet been determined) associated with products that Coltec
had previously manufactured.66 In other words, Coltec transferred "naked

using the pre-1996 version of Section 7805(b) and six resolved the issue using the
post-1996 version. (Search last run 7/18/13).
62. See infra note 88.
63. These cases are: Stobie Creek Inv., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl.
636 (2008); Murfam Farms, LLC, 88 Fed. Cl. 516; Sala, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167;
Klamath Strategic Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex.
2006); 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.
3d 749 (7th Cir. 2008); Maguire Partners - Master Inv., LLC v. United States, 2009
WL 4907033 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
64. 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006). For a similar transaction, see Black &
Decker v. Commissioner, 436 F.3d 431 (4th Cir. 2006).
65. Specifically, the assets consisted of $375M notes and $4.2M
nonbusiness property. Coltec, 436 F.3d at 1342.
66. Id. at 1343. Coltec also transferred employees to Newco to "manage"
these liabilities.
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liabilities" 6 7 to Newco-business liabilities severed from the business assets
with which they were associated. 8 In exchange for these transfers, Coltec
received Newco stock. This transaction had no tax consequence because it
qualified under section 351 of the Code.69
Soon afterwards and as always planned, Coltec sold the stock for
$500,000.70 Under general tax principles, Coltec would have reduced its
basis in the Newco stock by the amount of liabilities assumed by Newco,
claiming a basis of $4 million.7 ' However, under then-existing law, a
taxpayer was not required to reduce its basis in the transferee-corporate stock
(here, Newco) if the assumed liability would have been deductible by the
transferor (here, Coltec). 72 Coltec qualified for this exception and thus
claimed a basis equal to $379.2 million, allowing it to claim large losses
upon the sale of the Newco stock for $500,000 (the stock's value).
There are several reasons why this result was deemed troubling.
Some argued that Coltec's liability deduction was artificially accelerated,
violating the general rule that liabilities may not be deducted until the
liability amount can be determined with reasonable certainty.74 Under this
general rule, Coltec would not have been able to deduct the contingent
asbestos liabilities. However, by transferring the naked liabilities to Newco
and not reducing its basis in the Newco stock by the liability amount, Coltec
deducted that liability amount when calculating the losses associated with the
Newco stock sale.

67. See Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation,
supra note 31, at 745-46 ("The taxpayers . . . transferred over liabilities severed

from their businesses (naked liabilities) to generate capital losses from the sale of the
Newco stocks.").
68. Id.

69. I.R.C. § 351.
70. Coltec, 454 F.3d at 1344.
71. See I.R.C. § 358(d)(1) (providing that the assumption of a liability is
treated as money received, so that the transferor (here Coltec) would have to reduce
its basis by the amount of that liability). See also I.R.C. § 358(a)(1) (providing
general basis calculation for section 351 transfers).
72. I.R.C. § 358(d)(1).
73. See, e.g., Lee A. Sheppard, A More Intelligent Economic Substance

Doctrine, 112 TAX NoTEs 325, 330 (2006) ("The tax law is dead set against
premature recognition of expense and loss, as indicated by section 461(h) and the
all-events requirement."). See also 70 Fed. Reg. 37414, 17415 (explaining that in
transactions such as that involved in Coltec "taxpayers attempted to duplicate a loss
in corporate stock and to accelerate deduction that typically are allowed only on the
economic performance of these obligations.").
74. I.R.C. § 461(h). This requirement is known as the all events
requirement.
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Others argued that the Coltec transaction violated the general
principle that a deduction may only be claimed once." Coltec deducted the
liability amount in calculating its loss on the sale of the Newco stock. The
liability deduction, some argued, might then be duplicated if Newco were
later entitled to deduct the liability amount because it became fixed.76
In 2000, after these transactions were identified, Congress enacted
section 358(h), which applied to future section 351 transactions. Section
358(h) generally requires the transferor of property to reduce its basis in the
corporate stock acquired by the amount of contingent liabilities assumed by
the transferee corporation.n Thus, had section 358 been in effect at the time
of Coltec's transaction, Coltec would have been required to reduce its basis
by the contingent asbestos liabilities assumed by Newco and would not have
been able to claim large losses upon the sale of the Newco stock. 7
Congress, however, realized that section 358 only applied to
corporate transfers and that similar abuse could still occur at the partnership
level.79 Thus, in section 309(c) of the 2000 Tax Act, Congress authorized the
Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe rules that were "comparable" to those
in section 358 and to "provide appropriate adjustments to [the partnership tax
laws] to prevent the acceleration or duplication of losses through the
assumption of . .. liabilities described in section 358(h)(3) of the Code."80
Section 358(h)(3) makes clear that liabilities include both fixed and
contingent obligations.8 Section 309(c) of the 2000 Act also provided that
75. See Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation,

supranote 31, at 751 (summarizing these arguments).
7 6. Id.

77. I.R.C. § 358(h). Section 358(h)(1) provides that when the basis of the
partnership interest exceeds its fair market value, the basis will be reduced the basis
in that interest will be reduced (but not below its fair market value) by liabilities
assumed by the partnership. Section 358(h) makes clear that contingent liability
should be treated as other liabilities. Certain exceptions are found in section
358(h)(2). A basis reduction is not required if the assumed liability is part of "the
amount (determined as of the date of the exchange) of any liability "the trade or
business with which the liability is associated is transferred to the person assuming
the liability as part of the exchange, or substantially all of the assets with which the
liability is associated are transferred to the person assuming the liability as part of
the exchange." Coltec would not have qualified for these exceptions.
78. The difference between the $4.2 million basis and $500,000 sales price
might have been considered genuine loss.
79. 68 Fed. Reg. 36414, 37415 ("Congress recognizes that taxpayers were
attempting to use partnerships to carry out the same types of abuses that Section
358(h) was designed to deter.").
80. Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554
(app. G), § 309, 114 Stat. 2763A-587, 2763A-638 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 358 note)
[hereinafter Section 309, 2000 Tax Act].
81. I.R.C. § 358(h)(3).
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regulations issued under its grant of authority could be made retroactive to
October 18, 1999.82
Treasury then promulgated Regulation section 1.752-6, issued in
temporary version on June 24, 2003 and finalized on May 26, 2005.83 Under
Regulation section 1.752-6, when a taxpayer contributes property to a
partnership and that partnership also assumes contingent liabilities that
qualify under section 358(h), the partner must generally reduce its basis in
the partnership interest by the amount of the liability. 8 4 The regulation was
intended to "adopt the approach of section 358(h), with some
modifications.. .made to.. .conform the application of section 358(h) to
partnerships."ss
Treasury Regulation section 1.752-6 applies retroactively to
transactions occurring after October 18, 1999 and before June 24, 2003."86
The Treasury claimed that the regulation could operate retroactively because
it was expressly authorized by Congress in section 309(c) of the 2000 Tax
Act 87 and prevented abuse under section 7805(b)(3).8 Treasury explained
that "[t]hese ... regulations are necessary to prevent abusive transactions of
the type described in Notice 2000-44."89 That earlier Notice identified certain
partnership transactions that generated non-economic losses and alerted
taxpayers engaged in these transactions that these losses would be
disallowed. One of these transactions was virtually identical to the
transactions involved in the cases discussed below. 90 In its explanation of
Notice 2000-44 in the Federal Register, Treasury explained:
[I]n a transaction addressed in Notice 2000-44, a taxpayer purchases
and writes economically offsetting options and then purports to create
substantial positive basis by transferring those option positions to a
partnership. On the disposition of the partnership interest, the liquidation of
the partner's interest in the partnership or the taxpayer's sale or depreciation

82. Section 309, 2000 Tax Act, supra note 80.
83. 70 Fed. Reg. 37414,37414.
84. Reg. § 1.752-6.
85. T.D. 9207, Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 70 Fed. Reg. 30334,
30335 (May 26, 2005). One of these modifications was that exception found in
I.R.C. § 358(h)(2) would not apply to transactions described in Notice 2000-44,
2000-2 C.B. 255, and at issue in the cases described, infra. Thus, Regulation section
1.752-6 created an exception to section 358(h)(2)'s exception.
86. Reg. § 1.752-6(d); T.D. 9207, Assumption of Partner Liabilities, 70
Fed. Reg. 30334, 30335 (May, 26 2005).
87.
88.
89.
90.

See 70 Fed. Reg. 30334, 30335.
Id.
Id.
See infra Sections III.B. and IV.C.
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of distributed partnership assets, the taxpayer claims a tax loss, even though
the taxpayer has incurred no corresponding economic loss.9 '
Three cases clearly discuss whether Regulation 1.752-6 could
operate retroactively under section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception: 92 Murfam
Farms,LLC v. United States9 3 and Stobie Creek Investments, LLC v. United
States,94 decided by the Court of Federal Claims and Sala v. United States,95

decided by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado.
B.

Murfam Farms and Stobie Creek

The transactions in Murfam Farms, Stobie Creek97 and Sala 98
(discussed below) are extremely similar to the transaction in Coltec, except
that the former transactions involved partnerships rather than corporations. In
Murfam Farms, for instance, the taxpayers employed a version of the Son-ofBoss shelter known as COBRA (Currency Options Bring Rewards). 99 The
individual taxpayers-members of the Murphy Family-purchased and sold
long and short "put" currency options, and then contributed these offsetting
options to a partnership in exchange for partnership interests. 0 0 The
taxpayers claimed a high basis in these partnership interests equal to the
value of the long options but unreduced by the value of the short options.' 0 '
91. 70 Fed. Reg. 30334, 30335. See also Notice 2000-44, supra note 85.
92. In Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th Cir.
2008), Judge Easterbrook quickly found that the regulation fell within the express
grant of section 309(c). He did not appear to reach the issue of whether the
regulation was necessary to prevent tax abuse and deference was not discussed. In
Maguire Partners-MasterInvs., LLC v. United States, 2009 WL 4907033 (C.D.

Cal. 2009), the court found that the regulation could be applied retroactively but did
not directly address new section 7805(b). It instead appears to have found that the
regulation was valid because it did not depart from prior law. In Klamath Strategic
Inv. Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex. 2006), the court
failed to recognize a distinction between old and new section 7805(b), applying the
old abuse of discretion framework discussed in Section I to analyze the retroactivity
issue. This is odd and incorrect unless one is to assume that there is no difference
between the way one analyzes retroactive effect under the post- and pre-1996
versions of section 7805(b).
93. 88 Fed. Cl. 516 (2009).
94. 82 Fed. Cl. 636 (2008).
95. 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 2008), rev'd 613 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir.
2010).
96. Murfam Farms, 88 Fed. Cl. at 516.
97. Stobie Creek, 82 Fed. Cl. at 636.
98. Sala, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167.
99. Murfam Farms, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516, 519 (2009).
100. Idat 520.
101. Id
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Generally, in an exchange like that described, taxpayers must reduce their
basis in acquired partnership interests by the amount of liabilities assumed by
that partnership. However, under the then-existing Helmer doctrine, partners
did not have to reduce their bases by assumed contingent liability amounts,
including short options.10 2
The offsetting options expired according to their terms, at which
time the partnership acquired municipal bonds.'0 3 As was always planned,
the partnership interests were then transferred to an S corporation and the
partnership was liquidated.'" As was also planned, the S corporation then
sold the municipal bonds. 05 Because the corporation claimed that the high
basis in the partnership interests attached to the bonds, the sale generated a
large tax loss that was then allocated to the partners - the members of the
Murphy family.106 The government argued, inter alia,that Regulation 1.7526 applied retroactively to the taxpayer's transactions which would require the
taxpayers to reduce their bases in the bonds by the short option amount,
resulting in a disallowance of the large losses claimed. 0 7
The Court of Federal Claims in Murfam Farms first found that
section 309(c) of the 2000 Act did not expressly authorize the retroactive
application of Regulation section 1.752-6 because the regulation did not
"prevent the acceleration or duplication of losses" as required.'0 o In arguing
to the contrary, the government explained the similarity of the COBRA
transaction to the Coltec transaction, to which Congress had already
responded in Code section 358, and argued that, like that transaction, the
Murfam Farmstransaction resulted in duplicative losses.109 The first loss, the
government argued, was claimed by the partnership when the options expired
worthless. 1 o Because most or all of the options expired "out of the money"
the partnership claimed losses that were then allocated to the individual

102. Id. at 521.
103.Id. at 520.

104. Murfam Farms, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516, 520 (2009).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 521-2.
108. Id. at 523-26.
109. See United States Supplemental Memorandum Responding to Court

Order, supra note 59. It did not argue that the loss was accelerated, See United
States; Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment as to the Validity of Treasury Regulation 1.752-6,
Murfam Farms, 2010 WL 3260167 (Fed.Cl. Aug 16, 2010), No. 1:06-cv-00245-EJD
at 2-10 [hereinafter United States Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Validity of
Treasury Regulation 1.752-6].
110. United States Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Validity of
Treasury Regulation 1.752-6, supra note 109, at 4-10.
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members of the Murphy family, as partners.'1 A second duplicative loss, the
government argued, was claimed when the municipal bonds were sold by the
S corporation, because the S corporation "claimed that the artificially inflated
bases in their partnership interests then carried over and attached to the
[bonds]."ll 2 By doing so, the S corporation claimed a large non-economic
loss of $61,543,012 from this sale, and the individual members of the
Murphy family then reported their alleged pro-rata share of losses.1 3 The
court, however, rejected this argument. It agreed that the taxpayers had
artificially inflated their basis, which may have resulted in their claiming
non-economic losses. The court found, however, that because S corporations
are pass-through entities-i.e. entities that do not themselves pay taxes and
instead pass their taxable income to their owners-that the losses were not
duplicative as required by section 309(c).114
The court also found that Regulation section 1.752-6 did not prevent
abuse within the meaning of section 7805(b)(3). The government argued that
prevention of abuse should be defined expansively." 5 While abuse is not
defined in section 7805(b)(3), the government explained, it is defined
elsewhere in the Internal Revenue Code."16 For instance, it explained that
section 357(b)(1) provides an anti-abuse rule preventing taxpayers from
claiming that an exchange is tax free when the transferee assumes liabilities
"principally for tax avoidance purposes [that] lack a bona fide business
purpose.""'7 The government also cited the broad anti-abuse rules of
Treasury Regulation 1.701-2, which require that partnerships "be bona fide
and [that] each partnership transaction or series of transactions.. .be entered
into for a substantial business purpose."' The government argued that abuse
111. Id. at 4-10.

112. Id. at 4.
113. Id.
114. Id. The court found that the government's argument amounted to "a
cosmetic reframing of [the government's previously asserted] argument that [the
taxpayer's] transaction created 'artificially inflated basis in the S corporation."'
However, the court held, "[t]he mandate of Congress to the Treasury in Section
309(c)(1) ...was not to combat inflation of basis - artificial or otherwise - rather, to
preclude the acceleration and/or duplication of losses." Murfam Farms, LLC v.
United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516, 525-26 (2009).
115. To help it determine whether the retroactive application of Regulation
1.752-6 would "prevent abuse" within the meaning of section 7805(b)(3), the court
ordered the government to explain "how... 'prevention of abuse' under 26 U.S.C.
7805(b) [should] be defined?" See United States Supplemental Memorandum
Responding to Court Order, supra note 59, at 14.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See United States Supplemental Memorandum Responding to Court
Order, supra note 59, at 14.
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should be defined in a similarly broad manner for purposes of section
7805(b)(3) and that Regulation section 1.752-6 would prevent abuses that
also fell within these other anti-abuse provisions."' 9
The court, however, rejected these arguments, essentially finding
that a transaction was abusive within the meaning of section 7805(b)(3) only
if it lacked economic substance. In general, the economic substance doctrine
is used by courts to disallow the tax savings associated with transactions that
are not motivated by any substantial non-tax purpose or that fail to
meaningfully change the taxpayer's economic position aside from the tax
benefits claimed.12 0 The government argued that abuse should be defined to
include transactions lacking economic substance but should not be confined
only to those transactions.121 "Various statutes can be manipulated to
produce an array of different types of abuse ... [so that] ... the U.S. Treasury

is engaged in a perpetual game of catch up with the innovative geniuses who
seek to subvert the tax system and Congressional intent." 22 In light of this
known environment, the government argued, Congress intended abuse to be
defined expansively when enacting section 7805(b)(3).1 2 3
However, the United States Court of Federal Claims granted the
taxpayer's motion for summary judgment, invalidating retroactive
Regulation section 1.752-6, stating:
the question of whether the transaction at the heart
of this case lacked economic substance has yet to be
determined... [I]t is possible, at least in theory that the

transactions in which a partnership assumes the liabilities of
a partner without a corresponding reduction in the
partnership's outside basis could likewise have economic

substance.12 4

119. Id

120. I.R.C. § 7701(o)(1): "In the case of any transaction to which the
economic substance doctrine is relevant, such transaction shall be treated as having
economic substance only if-(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart

from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer's economic position, and (B) the
taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal income tax effects) for
entering into such transaction."
121. United States Supplemental Memorandum Responding to Court Order,
supra note 59, at 17.
122. Id. at 15 (citing IRS v. CM Holdings, Inc., 254 B.R. 578, 624 (D. Del.
2000), af'id, 301 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2002)).
123. Id.

124. Murfam Farms, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516, 526 (2009).
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The court, therefore, decided that "abuse" was synonymous with
transactions lacking economic substance, rejecting the government's
contrary arguments.
The Court of Federal Claims also invalidated Regulation section
1.752-6 in Stobie Creek,125 employing extremely similar reasoning.126
C.

Sala v. United States

In Sala,12 7 the taxpayer, Carlos Sala participated in a COBRA
transaction similar to the transactions conducted by the Murfam Family,
described above. Mr. Sala purchased long and short options which
"essentially offset one another"l 2 8 and contributed them along with $8
million in cash to a partnership.12 9 Rather than claiming a basis of $8 million
in the partnership interests, Mr. Sala included only the value of the long
options and claimed a basis of $69 million. 30 Like the taxpayers in Murfam
Farms, Mr. Sala did not reduce his basis by the short option amount,
claiming that it was a contingent liability falling under the previously
discussed Helmer doctrine.' 3 '
One month later, as was always planned, the partnership sold the
options "resulting in a profit of between $90,000 and $ 110,000",132 and

125. Stobie Creek Inv., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 636-38
(2008).
126. Id. at 667-71.
127. Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 2008), rev'd613

F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2010).
128. Id. at 1251. On October 23, 2000, Sala deposited an initial sum of
$500,000 into a personal account with Refco Capital Markets, which was managed
by Krieger through Deerhurst Management. Opting to participate beyond the "test
period," Sala contributed another $8,425,000 to his Refco account on November 21,
2000. Krieger used the funds in this account to acquire a combination of twenty-four
long and short foreign currency options on Sala's behalf, resulting in a net cost to
Sala of $728,297.85. The options had a total sales price of $60,259,568.94 for the
short options, if exercised, and a total purchase price of $60,987,866.79 for the long
options, if exercised. In other words, the long and short options essentially offset one
another. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. Applying the rule in Helmer, Solid calculated its adjusted basis in
Deerhurst GP by disregarding the short options. Thus, only the value of the long
options, approximately $61 million, plus $8 million in cash Solid contributed to the
partnership were used to calculate Solid's basis in its partnership interest. See 26
U.S.C. §§ 705, 722 (2006).
131. See supra pp. 14.
132. Sala, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
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liquidated."' Mr. Sala received $8 million in cash and two foreign currency
contracts. Mr. Sala claimed a $61 million basis in these contracts, a value far
in excess of their $1 million fair market value. 134 Mr. Sala sold the options
for this value and claimed a large loss.
Like the Court of Federal Claims in Murfam Farms and Stobie
Creek, the United States District Court for the District of Colorado held that
retroactive Regulation 1.752-6 was neither authorized by section 309(c) nor
properly enacted to prevent abuse under section 7805(b)(3).
As in Murfam Farms, the government explained how the COBRA
transaction in Sala was similar to the Coltec transaction. 13 5 It also argued that
"[t]he promulgation of Treas. Reg. § 1.752-6 was necessary to prevent
certain taxpayers who - prevented from abusing the corporate form by the
new I.R.C. § 358 - would undoubtedly 'go down the street' to the
partnership form in order to avoid paying their fair share of taxes,"1 36
rendering Code section 358(h) "impotent." 3 7
The District Court, however, rejected these arguments, explaining:
..the facts show Sala's participation in the
Deerhurst program was a genuine investment transaction
that possessed economic substance and was entered into for
the purposes of realizing profits above and beyond the tax
losses. Because Sala's investment in the Deerhurst program
was not abusive, it is immaterial whether other transactions
of the general type he entered into were abusive.13 8
Thus, like the Court of Federal Claims, the District Court decided
that the term abuse was synonymous with transactions that lack economic
substance and independently defined section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception
narrowly.

133. Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D. Colo. 2008), rev'd 613
F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2010).
134. Id. at 1200.
135. The government again did so in claiming that Reg. 1.752-6 was
authorized under section 309. "Treas. Reg. 1.752-6 goes to the very heart of the
harm referred to by Congress in Section 309 of the 2000 act - abusive transactions
designed to inflate basis artificially in a way that creates an artificial tax loss."
United States' Supplemental Brief at 9, Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167
(D. Colo. 2008) (No. 1:05-cv-00636-LTB-KTM) [hereinafter United States' Sala
Supplemental Brief]. The Colorado District Court in Sala held that Regulation
1.752-6 exceeded the statutory authority. Sala, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1200.
136. United States' Sala Supplemental Brief, supra note 135, at 9.
137. Id.

138. Sala, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 1202.

Tax Abuse According to Whom?

2013]

D.

25

Where's the Deference?

Generally, an agency's interpretation of a statute it is entrusted to
administer is entitled to some level of deference. In order to determine the
level of deference owed to Treasury Regulation section 1.752-6, the courts in
each of the described cases used administrative law principles now rejected
by the Supreme Court in Mayo Foundationv. UnitedStates.1 3 9
As discussed in greater detail below, generally courts apply the twopart test set forth in United States v. Mead Corp.14 0 to determine whether an
agency's statutory interpretation is owed the strong deference articulated in
Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council 4 1 or the lesser standard of
deference articulated in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.1 4 2 Before Mayo,143 however,
it was not clear whether the Mead test applied to tax regulations or whether
the standards articulated in Rowan Cos. v. United StateS144 and United States
v. Vogel Fertilizer Co. 4 5 controlled.14 6 While Rowan and Vogel pre-dated
Chevron and Mead, the latter two cases were not tax-specific. Thus, some
argued that Rowan and Vogel, which involved tax regulations, still applied to
Treasury interpretations.14 7 Under these two cases, tax regulations issued
under specific Congressional grants of authority were entitled to strong
Chevron deference. However, some believed that Treasury Regulations
issued under general grants of authority-such as that provided in section
7805(a), authorizing Treasury to provide "all needful rules and
regulations"4' 8-should be scrutinized under the multi-factored approach
articulated in National Muffler DealersAss'n, Inc. v. United States,149 which
139. 131 S. Ct. 704, 704 (2011).
140.
141.
142.
143.

533 U.S. 218, 218 (2001).
467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984).
323 U.S. 134, 134 (1944).
Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 704.

144. 452 U.S. 247 (1981).
145. 455 U.S. 16 (1982).
146. Kristin Hickman, The Needfor Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in

JudicialDeference, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1537, 1549 (2006) [hereinafter Hickman, The
Needfor Mead] (explaining the post-Mayo framework).
147. Id.
148. I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2006).

149. 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979). ("In determining whether a particular
regulation carries out the congressional mandate in a proper manner, we look to see
whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin
and its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if it is a substantially
contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have been aware
of congressional intent. If the regulation dates from a later period the manner in
which it evolved merits inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time
the regulation has been in effect, the reliance place on it, the consistency of the
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involved the interpretation of a Treasury Regulation.15 0 The Mayo Court
rejected the distinction between general and specific authority regulations
and held that the Mead test should be applied to determine the deference
owed to tax regulations.' 5' Mayo also made clear that all tax regulations that
cleared Mead's two-part test were Chevron eligible, regardless of whether
they were issued under a specific or general grant of authority.'52
The cases analyzing Regulation section 1.752-6 predated Mayo. As a
result, those cases utilized the now-rejected distinction between regulations
promulgated under general versus specific grants of authority. Specifically,
in each of the cases discussed above, the courts believed strong deference
should apply only if Regulation section 1.752-6 was promulgated pursuant to
section 309(c)'s express authorization. After finding that the regulation was
not expressly authorized, each of these cases suggested that while a lesser
standard of deference might apply, Regulation 1.752-6 must be
invalidated.'5

commissioner's interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to
the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of the statute.").
150. In National Muffler, a trade organization representing muffler dealers
sued for an income tax refund, claiming that they were entitled to the so-called
"business league" exception and that the treasury regulation defining "business
league" (a definition which would exclude muffler dealers) was not a valid

interpretation of the statute granting the exemption. See Hickman, The Need For
Mead, supra note 146. See also Ellen Aprill, Irvin Salem & Linda Galler, ABA
Section of Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX
LAWYER 717, 740 (2004) ("This Report reviews post-Chevron tax cases through the

end of 2003, and concludes that although Chevron's two-step process has been
affirmed for tax cases, the Supreme Court nonetheless has consistently applied the
National Muffler test to determine if a general authority regulation is reasonable.");
Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law:

The Original Convention, 116 HARv. L. REV. 467, 570-75 (2002) (discussing tax
exceptionalism in administrative law); Paul Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don 't Let
Your Babies Grow up to be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX. REV. 517 (1994).
151. Mayo Found. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 713-14 (2011) ("We

have held that Chevron deference is appropriate 'when it appears that Congress has
delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law,
and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the

exercise of that authority... Our inquiry in that regard does not turn on whether
congress' delegation was general or specific.").
152. Id. at 714 ("We believe Chevron and Mead, rather than National
Muffler and Rowan, provide the appropriate framework for evaluating [the tax
regulation at issue.])
153. The Courts also appeared to believe that once the regulation fell
outside the Congressional grant of section 309(c), Treasury could not invoke section
7805(b)(3) at all. For instance, in Stobie Creek the Court of Federal Claims stated:
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Mayo, however, clearly rejected the "tax exceptionalist"l 5 4
methodology used by these courts, holding that the level of deference courts
owe Treasury Regulations depends on the same general framework applied
to all other agency regulations. Thus, neither courts nor scholars have had the
opportunity to speak to the questions upon which the remainder of this
Article focuses:'ss When the Treasury Department issues a retroactive
regulation pursuant to section 7805(b)(3), is that regulation's interpretation
of tax abuse entitled to deference? If so, what level of deference should these
interpretations receive?
To address these questions, this Article now turns to the general
administrative law framework that is, after Mayo, clearly applicable to
Treasury Regulations.
IV.

A.

WHO SHOULD INTERPRET TAX ABUSE?

The Relevant Deference Doctrines

When determining whether an agency regulation is a valid
interpretation of the statute to which it relates, there are two predominant
[The government] alternatively argues that the retroactive
application of Treasury Regulation § 1.752-6 is appropriate
pursuant to I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3) in order 'to prevent abuse.' ... it
would be an incongruous result to defer to Treasury's
determination that a particular regulation must apply retroactively
in order to prevent abuse, when Congress saw fit to decree the end
of one named abuse on a retroactive basis (acceleration and
duplication of losses), but not all potential abuses related to
transfers of partnership assets. Because Treasury Regulation §
1.752-6 exceeds the congressional mandate to address transactions
that accelerate and duplicate losses, this broad 'abuse prevention'
authority cannot serve as an alternate ground for validating
retroactive application.
Stobie Creek Inv., LLC v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 636, 671 (2008).
154. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
155. The Circuit Courts to which these cases were appealable did not
address issues regarding section 7805(b). In 2009, the taxpayers and the Internal
Revenue Service reached a settlement in Murfam Farms,so that the issue will not be
considered by the Federal Circuit, to which it was appealable. Murfam Farms, LLC
ex rel. Murphy v. United States, 2010 WL 3260167 (Fed. Cl. Aug 16, 2010)
(referring to settlement agreement). On appeal in Sala, the Tenth Circuit did not
address the issue of retroactivity, finding it unnecessary because the taxpayer was
not entitled to the claimed losses on other grounds. Sala v. United States, 613 F.3d
1249 (10th Cir. 2010). In Stobie Creek, the government did not appeal the issue of
retroactivity. Stobie Creek Inv. LLC v. United States, 608 F.3d 1366, 1374 (n.4)
(Fed. Cir. 2010).
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standards of deference that a court might apply. A regulation might receive
the strong level of deference articulated in Chevron v. Natural Resource
Defense Council.156 If a regulation is not Chevron-eligible, courts will
generally apply the multi-factored "sliding-scale" approach articulated in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co. '
1.

Skidmore v. Swift & Co.: An Intermediate,Sliding-Scale
Standardof Review

In the 1944 Supreme Court case Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,' 58 the
Supreme Court held that the weight to be accorded to an agency's judgment
should "depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control." 5 9 The approach advocated in Skidmore is often
referred to as "sliding-scale deference" since a court may, after considering
the various factors discussed above, view the agency interpretation with
"great respect," "near indifference," or something anywhere between the
two.160
For about four decades after Skidmore was decided, this standard
"enjoyed prominence as perhaps the Supreme Court's best expression of its
policy of judicial deference toward many if not most agency interpretations
of law."l 6' In 1984, however, Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council 62 dramatically shifted the administrative law landscape.

156. 467 U.S. 837, 837 (1984).
157. 323 U.S. 134, 134 (1944).
158. Id.

159. Id. at 140.
160. See. e.g. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of a
Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 1235, 1242 (2007) [hereinafter
Hickman & Krueger, Modern Skidmore Standard] (posit[ing] that Skidmore's

sliding scale encompasses three zones or "moods" reflecting strong, intermediate,
and weak or no deference). See also Amy J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle ofMead
and Christensen: What Would Justice Stevens Do? 74 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1877 at
1887 (2006) (discussing Skidmore deference).

161. See. e.g., Hickman & Krueger, Modern Skidmore Standard,supra note
160, at 1242.
162. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council: A Strong
Standardof Review

In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council 63 the Supreme

Court articulated a two-part deference standard for reviewing an agency's
interpretation of the statute it is entrusted to administer. Under Chevron, a
court must first ask whether "Congress had spoken to the precise question at
issue"l 6 4 (Chevron Step 1). If Congress has done so, courts must "give effect
to the unambiguous expressed intent of Congress." 65 If, however, Congress
has left a gap or ambiguity that it intended an agency to fill or clarify,' a
court should uphold the agency interpretation so long as it is a "permissible
construction of the statute" 6 7 that is not "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly
contrary" to the law (Chevron Step 2).168
Immediately after Chevron, it appeared that all statutory ambiguities
might be viewed as implicit delegations, making agency interpretations of
those ambiguities eligible for Chevron deference.' 69 With this sweeping
scope, it was unclear whether the Skidmore approach was rendered "an
anachronism"170 or whether there remained situations to which Skidmore
could apply. In 2001, the Supreme Court spoke to these issues in United

163. Id. at 838.
164. Id. at 842.

165. Id.at 843.
166. Chevron is premised on the notion that courts should defer to agency
interpretations when and only when Congress intended that agency to interpret its
laws. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). In its recent decision, United States v. Home Concrete
& Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012), the Supreme Court emphasized that
Chevron's first step seeks to solve the "underlying interpretive problem ... of

deciding whether, or when a particular statute in effect delegates to an agency the
power to fill a gap, thereby implicitly taking from a court the power to void a
reasonable gap-filling interpretation." Id. at 1843.
167. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984).
168. Id.

169. Adrian Vermeule, Introduction:Mead in the Trenches, 71 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 347, 348 (2003) [hereinafter Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches] ("[T]he key
innovation of Chevron is to create a global interpretive presumption: ambiguities are,
without more, taken to signify implicit delegations of interpretive authority to the
administering agency.").
170. Hickman & Krueger, Modern Skidmore Standard,supra note 160, at

1242-43 ("Chevron did not make clear when exactly courts should presume that
Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency, or concomitantly, when
Chevron's framework of controlling deference was appropriate."). Id. at 1243.
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States v. Mead Corporation,"' narrowing the set of situations to which

Chevron deference appliesl7 2 and making clear that Skidmore retained a
place in the administrative law landscape.' 73
Because Mead sets forth a two-part test to determine whether an
agency's statutory interpretation is eligible for Chevron deference, Mead is
often referred to as creating a "Step Zero" test. 174
3.

Step Zero: United States v. Mead Corporation7 1

76
In United States v. Mead Corporation,1
the Supreme Court found
that an agency's statutory interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference if
two criteria are satisfied: First, "Congress [must have] delegated authority to

171. 533 U.S. 218 (2001). Mead built upon Christensen v. Harris County,
529 U.S. 576 (2000). See e.g. Hickman, The Need for Mead, supra note 146, at
1550-51 ("Mead and its foreshadowing predecessor, Christensen v. Harris County,
clearly establish that the choice for the courts is not between Chevron or no
deference at all by revitalizing the classic, pre-Chevron deference case of Skidmore
v. Swift & Co. as an intermediate deferential alternative."). Id. The Supreme Court
also spoke to Step Zero issues in Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
However, Mead represents the predominant method for determining whether an
agency interpretation is Chevron eligible. For discussion of the confusion initially
created by Barnhart,see generally Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REv. 1443 (2005) [hereinafter
Bressman, Mead Has Muddled JudicialReview].
172. Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches, supra note 169, at 348 ("Mead
reverses this global presumption. Rather than taking ambiguity to signify delegation,
Mead establishes that the default rule runs against delegation.").
173. Hickman, The Needfor Mead, supra note 146, at 1550-51 ("Mead and
its foreshadowing predecessor, Christensen v. Harris County, clearly establish that
the choice for the courts is not between Chevron or no deference at all by revitalizing
the classic, pre-Chevron deference case of Skidmore v. Swift & Co. as an
intermediate deferential alternative.").
174. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REv. 187, 211
(2006) [hereinafter Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero] (referring to Mead, Christensen,
and Barnhartas a "step Zero trilogy" in which "the Court ha[d] attempted to sort out
the applicability of the Chevron framework."). See also Hickman & Krueger,
Modern Skidmore Standard,supra note 160, at 1247 ("Some have described Mead's
inquiry as a 'step zero' in the overall analytical framework, coming before the
application of either Chevron's two steps or Skidmore's multiple factors. Others
view Mead as 'sort of a Chevron step one-and-one-half,' relevant only if the
reviewing court first concludes that the statute's meaning is ambiguous.") Id. This
Article will refer to the questions dictating whether Chevron applies to a particular
regulation as "step zero" questions with recognition that "both conceptualizations are
technically correct."
175. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).

176. Id
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the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of the law.""' (Mead
Step 1). Second, "the agency interpretation claiming deference [must have
been] promulgated in the exercise of that authority." 78 (Mead Step 2).
In Mead, the Court found that agency interpretations issued pursuant
to Congress' express authorization "to engage in the process of rulemaking
or adjudication that produce[d] regulations or rulings," 7 9 were likely to
satisfy Mead's first step.180 Thus, the requisite "force of law" delegation
required by Mead Step I is almost certain to exist where Congress has
authorized the agency to issue rules through notice-and-comment rulemaking
or formal adjudication, creating what some have called a procedural safe
harbor.'
The Mead Court, however, was clear that an agency interpretation
would not be rendered ineligible for Chevron deference solely for "want of
procedure." 82 Thus, the Customs Ruling in Mead was not barred from
receiving Chevron deference solely because it was not subject to notice-andcomment rulemaking, but also because the Court could find nothing
"suggesting that Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving"
that deference. 83 However, the Court did not make clear what criteria an
agency interpretation "wanting procedure" could possess to make it eligible
for Chevron deference.
Having articulated this important two-part test for determining the
scope of Chevron deference, the Mead Court also reaffirmed Skidmore's
continuing vitality. According to the Court, if an interpretation fails either of
Mead's two steps (as did the Ruling at issue), a reviewing court should apply
Skidmore's sliding scale approach to determine whether, and to what extent,
courts should defer to the agency's interpretation.184
177. Id. at 226-27.
178. Id. at 239.
179. Id. at 240 (referring to this express authorization as a "good indicator"
that the requisite delegation had been made). Id. at 219.
180. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). "It is fair to assume
generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law
when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster
the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force."
Id. at 230.
181. Id. at 246.
182. Id. at 251.
183. Id. at 23 1.
184. Id. at 234. "Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that
an agency's interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the
'specialized experience and broader investigations and information' available to the
agency, and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial
understandings of what a national law requires." Id. at 235. The Court continued,
"There is room at least to raise a Skidmore claim here, where the regulatory scheme
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As discussed, the cases which have assessed the validity of
retroactive regulations under new section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception used
the now-rejected distinction between general authority and specific authority
regulations to analyze the level of deference owed to Treasury's
interpretation of section 7805(b)(3). This Article will now focus on the level
of deference a reviewing court owes a Treasury Regulation's interpretation
of section 7805(b)(3) under the now-applicable framework sanctioned in
Mayo.
B.

Are Treasury'sInterpretationsofSection 7805(b) (3) ChevronEligible?

As discussed above, an agency's statutory interpretation is eligible
for Chevron deference if it satisfies each of the two steps articulated in
United States v. Mead Corp.' 5 In determining whether a Treasury
Regulation issued under to section 7805(b)(3) satisfies Mead's first step, a
court must ask whether Congress delegated authority to Treasury to interpret
section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception with binding legal effect.18 6
1.

Mead Step 1: Did CongressDelegate to Treasury the Power
to InterpretTax Abuse with the Force of the Law?

In its 2013 decision, City ofArlington v. FederalCommunications,18
the Supreme Court held that when Congress delegates to an agency general
authority to administer a particular statute it has vested that agency with
authority to make legally binding rules.'88 As section 7805(a) authorizes
Treasury to provide "all needful rules and regulations"'8 9 necessary to
is highly detailed, and Customs can bring the benefit of specialized experience to
bear on the subtle questions in this case. . . ." Id See also Kristin E. Hickman,
Unpacking Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REv. 465, 485 (2013) ("In Mead, the Court
held that Chevron applies only if Congress has given the agency in question the
authority to bind regulated parties with 'the force of law' and if the agency has 'in
fact acted in the exercise of that authority.' If either of these conditions is lacking,
then Skidmore provides the appropriate evaluative standard.").
185. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
186. Id. at 226-27 (requiring a court to ask whether "Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of the law.").

187. 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
188. Id at 1874 ("It suffices to decide this case that the preconditions to
deference under Chevron are satisfied because Congress has unambiguously vested
the FCC with general authority to administer the Communications Act through
rulemaking and adjudication, and the agency interpretation at issue was promulgated
in the exercise of that authority.").

189. I.R.C. § 7805(a).
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enforce the Code, interpretations found in Treasury Regulations, including
interpretations of section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception would seem to easily
pass Mead's first hurdle.190 Therefore, these interpretations will be eligible
for Chevron deference so long as they are "promulgated in the exercise of
th[e] authority" granted in section 7805(a),' 9 ' Mead's second hurdle.
2.

Mead Step 2: How Does Treasury Exercise its Authority to
Interpret Section 7805(b)(3)?

When Treasury interprets a provision of the Code by issuing a
regulation pursuant to notice-and-comment or other formal adjudication
procedures, it is clear that Treasury has acted within the exercise of the
general authority granted in section 7805(a), and Chevron deference is
warranted.19 2 However, as explained in Section III, when promulgating
Regulation section 1.752-6, Treasury explained its reasons for making that
regulation retroactive under section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception in the
preamble. Treasury has not, however, issued any stand-alone regulations that
define "abuse" for purposes of section 7805(b)(3). When Treasury interprets
section 7805(b)(3) in the preamble of a regulation it intends to apply
retroactively, is that interpretation "in the exercise" of the general authority
granted by Congress? 93
The authority on this question appears to be scant.' 94 However, since
a Treasury Regulation issued pursuant to notice-and-comment carries the
force of the law under Mayo's procedural safe harbor, there seems a strong
argument that Treasury's explanation of why that regulation prevents abuse
within the meaning of section 7805(b)(3), made in the preamble to that
regulation, should carry the same force so long as that explanation is subject
to review during the entire notice-and-comment period.
If this were not so, each time Treasury wished to respond to a tax
transaction by invoking its power under section 7805(b)(3) (e.g. by issuing
190. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.

191. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
192. Mayo Found. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 710 (2011).
193. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27.
194. There are various cases which address the question whether to accord
deference to a declaration in the preamble of a regulation that the regulation will
preempt state law, but the holdings of these cases are overwhelmed by the special
nature of preemption and the problems of allowing a federal agency to declare that
federal law trumps state law. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2006)
(discussing the deference accorded to "an agency's explanation [here, made in a
regulatory preamble] of how state law affects the regulatory scheme. . . ."); Fidelity

Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 154. See
generally Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and
the Federalizationof Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 227 (2007).
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Regulation section 1.752-6) it would have to write a separate regulation
declaring that the transaction to which it responded (e.g. the COBRA
transaction) was abusive within the meaning of section 7805(b)(3).
Requiring Treasury to take this additional action seems redundant, though
Treasury might wish to avoid this ambiguity in the future by issuing separate
regulations interpreting tax abuse.' 95
V.

APPLYING CHEVRON TO TREASURY'S INTERPRETATIONS
OF TAX ABUSE

If it is determined that Treasury's interpretation of section
7805(b)(3) passes Mead's hurdles, that interpretation will be analyzed under
Chevron's two-part framework. Thus, a court must first apply Chevron's first
step (discussed supra) to determine whether Congress intended Treasury to
interpret section 7805(b)(3). Clearly, Treasury's power to issue retroactive
regulations to "prevent abuse" is an ambiguous one. When terms in a statute
possess ambiguities courts generally infer that Congress intended a relevant
agency to clarify them. However, the powers granted in section 7805(b) are
purposefully limited and prohibit retroactive regulation unless certain
exceptions apply. It is therefore not clear whether Congress intended
Treasury to interpret the meaning of these exceptions, including section
7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception, or expected courts to play this role. To answer
this question, this Article considers the way in which section 7805(b)(3) fits
within the Internal Revenue Code, the legislative history of section
7805(b)(3), and the special expertise of the Treasury and Internal Revenue
Service.

195. In Barnhart v. Walton, the Supreme Court found that in cases where
the agency interpretation did not fall within Mead's procedural safe harbor, courts
should determine the proper level of deference by considering "the interstitial nature
of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the
question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and
the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of
time." 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). How Barnhartand Mead fit together-if they do

so at all-is the subject of some debate. See generally Bressman, Mead Has
Muddled Judicial Review, supra note 171. However, it seems the Barnhart factors

could help in determining when an interpretation found in a preamble merits
Chevron deference.
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Chevron 1: Did Congress Intend for Treasury to Interpret Tax
Abuse?
1.

Section 7805(b)(3) 's Role in the Code

In addition to section 7805(b)(3), there are multiple other provisions
in the Code that grant Treasury open-ended power to police tax abuse. For
example, the Code allows the Treasury Secretary to reapportion "gross
income, deductions, credits, or allowances ... among [commonly controlled]
organizations . .. if he determines that . . . [it] ...is necessary ... to prevent
evasion of taxes . . . .96
The Code also allows the Treasury Secretary to
require taxpayers to provide information about transactions determined to
"hav[e] a potential for tax avoidance or evasion."197 In this way, section
7805(b)(3) is one of many instances where Congress sought to give broad
power to Treasury to prevent abuse of the tax laws, at least suggesting that
Congress intended Treasury to interpret what it means to "prevent abuse."
This conclusion is greatly bolstered by the legislative history of section

7805(b)(3).1 9 8
2.

Legislative History

As discussed previously, section 7805(b) does not explicitly define
"abuse" and its legislative history does not elaborate further.199 The Joint
Committee Report adds little, stating only that the "abuse" to which section

196. I.R.C. § 482.
197. I.R.C. § 6707A.
198. Chevron instructs courts to determine "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue," applying the "traditional tools of statutory
construction." Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842, n. 9 (1984). This Article therefore assumes that legislative history may be
used in determining whether an agency interpretation satisfies Chevron's first step.
For an interesting discussion on this matter, see e.g. Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Chevron's Mistake, 58 DUKE L. J. 549 (2009).

199. See, e.g., Murfam Farms, LLC v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 516, 526
(2009) ("Unfortunately, 'abuse' is not defined by the statute."). See also Sala v.
United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1201 (D. Colo. 2008) ("The question of what
constitutes 'abuse' is not clarified by the statute.") (citing Edward A. Morse,
Reflections on the Rule ofLaw and "Clear Reflection of Income:" What Constrains
Discretion?, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 445, 488 (1999) ("The scope of this

exception is unclear and it remains to be seen whether it will be exercised
independently of Congress' power to authorize retroactive regulations.")).
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7805(b)(3) refers is "abuse of the statute." 20 0 Nonetheless, the legislative
history of section 7805(b) provides useful information about Congress' intent
in enacting section 7805(b)(3)'s "abuse exception."
Section 7805(b) is part of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 [hereinafter
"TBOR 2"]. The idea for the original Taxpayer Bill of Rights [hereinafter
"TBOR 1"] appears to have emanated from the first speech then-Democratic
Representative Harry Reid201 delivered to the House of Representatives.20 2 In
his "maiden address," 203 Representative Reid expressed the need for
legislation that would "give the average taxpayer . . . additional rights in

dealing with the Internal Revenue Service." 204 Immediately after hearing
Reid's speech, Republican Senator David Pryor communicated to Reid his
desire to partner in the effort to write and pass this legislation.205
The final version of TBOR 1 was signed into law by President
Ronald Regan in 1988206 and enumerated certain rights of American
taxpayers.20 7 TBOR I required the Treasury Secretary to issue a "simple and
nontechnical" 208 statement describing the taxpayer's rights, as well as an
explanation of the audit process, the method of appeal available to the
taxpayer, and the methods by which the IRS may collect unpaid tax

200. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 104TH CONG., BACKGROUND
AND INFORMATION RELATING TO THE TAXPAYER BILL OF RIGHTS 22 (Comm. Print
1995).
201. Harry Reid first became Senator of Nevada in 1986.
202. 138 CONG. REC. 2831 (1992) (statement of Sen. Harry Reid,
recounting that "the first speech [he] gave on the House Floor... related to the
taxpayer bill of rights.").
203. Id. at 2822 (statement of Sen. David Pryor, referring to Reid's "maiden
address").
204. Id. See also IRS Implementation of the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Private Retirement Plans and Oversight of the
Internal Revenue Service of the S. Comm. on Finance, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 3

(1990) (statement of Harry Reid).
205. This event is recounted several times by Senators Pryor and Reid. See,
e.g., 138 CONG. REc. 2822, 2831 (1992) where Senators Pryor and Reid recount the
formation of their partnership. For instance, Pryor recounts: "I will never forget at
the conclusion of [Reid's maiden address] I sent the distinguished Senator a note
saying I want to be your partner, I want to join with you because we need to give the
average taxpayer in our country additional rights in dealing with the Internal
Revenue Service." Id. at 2822.
206. Pub. L. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730-52 (1988).
207. The Taxpayer Bill of Rights was enacted in sections 6226 through
6247 of the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (TAMRA), Pub. L.
100-647, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730-52 (1988).
208. Pub. L. 100-647, §§ 6247-51, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730-52 (1988).
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liabilities. 20 9 TBOR 1 also expanded the rights of taxpayers by, for instance,
allowing a taxpayer to recover previously unrecoverable administrative and
litigation costs from the IRS, 2 10 creating "the right of the taxpayer to rely on
the written advice of the Internal Revenue Service," 2 11 by abating penalties
under certain circumstances when the relied-upon advice was erroneous, 212
creating new causes of action against the IRS for negligently failing to
release a taxpayer lien,213 and for recklessly or negligently disregarding
provisions of the Code and/or regulations.214
In 1996, the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, of which new section 7805(b)
is part, was enacted to improve upon and increase the taxpayer protections
provided by TBOR 1.215 Senator Pryor and now-Senator Reid were again at
the forefront in advocating this legislation.2 16
The issue of retroactive regulation was not discussed in the first
hearing relating to TBOR 2. This first hearing, held by the Senate Finance
Committee in April 1990, was held to evaluate whether the IRS was
implementing TBOR 1 in a manner which set "the individual rights of the
209. For the full document explaining these items, see Internal Revenue
Service, Declarationof Taxpayer Rights, Publication 1, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/pl.pdf. As explained at the beginning of this publication "[t]he first part ...
explains some of [the] taxpayer's most important rights . . . . The second part

explains the examination, appeal, collection, and refund processes." Id.
210. I.R.C. § 7430 (2006). See also 142 CONG. REc. 17371 (1996) (Senator
Pryor explains TBOR 1 and states that it provided "the right of the taxpayer to
recover, for the first time, civil damages and attorney's fees from the Internal
Revenue Service.").
211. Id
212. Pub. L. 100-647, § 6229, 102 Stat. 3342, 3733 (1988) (amending
I.R.C. § 6404(f)(1) which reads: "The Secretary shall abate any portion of any
penalty or addition to tax attributable to erroneous advice furnished to the taxpayer
in writing by an officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service, acting in such
officer's or employee's official capacity.")
213. I.R.C. § 7432 (2006).
214. I.R.C. § 7433 (2006).
215. See, e.g., Reforms to Establish Taxpayer Safeguards and Protect the
Rights of Taxpayers Under the Internal Revenue Code: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the H.R. Comm. on Ways and Means, 102d Cong.
[hereinafter 1991 House Hearings] (press release July 12, 1991) ("The Honorable J.
J. Pickle (D. Texas) Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight, Committee on
Ways and means, U.S. House of Representatives announced today that the
Subcommittee will conduct hearings to review reforms to establish taxpayers
safeguards in dealing with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and to protect the
rights of taxpayers under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).")
216. See generally IRS Implementation of the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Private Retirement Plans and Oversight of the
InternalRevenue Service of the S. Comm. on Finance,101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
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American taxpayer [as] a high priority," 2 17 and whether TBOR 1 was itself
providing adequate protections to taxpayers.2 18 Following Senator David
Pryor's brief opening statement, Senator Reid recited a poem based on T.S.
Elliot's "The Wasteland:"
April is the cruelest month, sending 1040's [sic]
across the land . . . And as the IRS was churlish, crafting

new abuses, Congress, it passed a Bill of Rights. The
Agency's leash was tightened. They had to say, taxpayers
you have rights. The IRS must follow rules. In the
meantime, all citizens are free to inquire about their rights
and keep their legal wage.2 19
After this recital, Reid encouraged the committee to "keep [sic] the
pressure on" the IRS to ensure it took "both the spirit and the letter of the
Taxpayers' Bill of Rights seriously and [was] incorporat[ing TBOR's]
philosophy into all its activities."22 0
The hearings commenced with statements by and the questioning of
various employees of the IRS who testified generally as to the measures
taken to comply with TBOR 1. The committee also heard statements by
public witnesses who had been mistreated by the IRS.22 1 Some of these
statements were extremely emotional, including for instance, a statement by
an individual taxpayer whose husband's experience with the IRS had
allegedly caused him to commit suicide.222 This initial hearing, therefore,
seemed to be devoted to information collection.
In July 1991, the Subcommittee on Oversight of the House on Ways
and Means announced in a press release its intention to hold two more
substantive hearings that would "review reforms to establish taxpayer
safeguards in dealing with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and to protect
the rights of taxpayers under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC)." 2 23 This press
release invited interested parties to participate either through the filing of
written statements or by testifying at the scheduled hearings.

217. Id.
218. Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. Pryor, chairman of the subcommittee): "This
brings me to the second subject of today's hearing, a look at the legislation itself to
see if it is providing the necessary protections for the taxpayers." Id.
219. Id. at 3-4.
220. Id. at 5.
221. Id. at 18-21.
222. Id. at 18-19.
223. Press Release, Subcomm. on Oversight of the H.R. Comm. on Ways
and Means House of Representatives, Hearings on Reforms to Establish Taxpayer
Safeguards (July 12, 1991) (on file with author).
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Chairman Jake Pickle identified thirteen reforms that would be
discussed at the two hearings. Most of these reforms seemed to be an
extension of the reforms made in TBOR 1. For instance, the press release
stated that the Subcommittee would consider reforms that would require the
IRS to formalize its appeals procedures, 224 allow the taxpayer to appeal court
decisions regarding certain penalties, 225 and shift the burden of proof to the
IRS on certain issues. 226
The press release also stated that the Subcommittee would consider
reforms that would "provide protections for taxpayers who make 'good faith'
efforts to comply with the tax laws during the period between enactment of
the law and issuance of clear guidelines and final regulations."2 27 It is to this
category of "good faith reforms" that the issue of retroactive regulation
would be linked.
While there seemed ample opportunity to discuss the issue of
retroactive regulation at the two hearings that followed, the subject was
discussed only at the second by representatives of two professional
organizations both of whom supported a flat prohibition on retroactive
rulemaking.
At the first hearing in July 1991, Damon Holmes, then-IRS Taxpayer
Ombudsman was invited to "share his views on the problems affecting
taxpayers and the possible remedies for those problems."228 The Office of the
Taxpayer Ombudsman was originally created by the IRS and later codified in
TBOR 1229 "to serve as the primary advocate, within the IRS, for
taxpayers," 23 0 and "to issue Taxpayer Assistance Orders (TAOs) when
taxpayers were suffering or about to suffer significant hardships because of
the way the Internal Revenue laws were being administered." 2 3 1 At these July
1991 hearings, Mr. Holmes laid out various ways to reduce the burdens on
taxpayers, focusing on simplification, communication, modernization, and

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.

227. Id.: "The [other] reforms under consideration would: (a) require [the]
IRS to establish formal taxpayer appeal procedures covering the IRS collection
process; (b) allow taxpayers to challenge in Tax Court [the] assessment [sic] of
additional interest that are [sic] based on IRS determinations that underpayments
were tax-motivated; (c) shift the burden of proof from taxpayers to [the] IRS in
certain situations [and] (d) improve taxpayers' access to reimbursements for
attorneys' fees. . . ."
228. 1991 House Hearings,supra note 215, at 11.

229. Pub. L. 100-647, §§ 6247-51, 102 Stat. 3342, 3730-52 (1988).
230. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, Part 13, http://www.irs.gov/irm/partl3/
index.html.
23 1.Id.
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other procedural improvements.232 The issue of retroactive regulation was
not discussed in these hearings, perhaps because substantive tax matters
might have been seen as falling outside of the Taxpayer Ombudsman's role.
However, at the second hearing in September 1991, Kenneth
Gideon, Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy at the U.S. Department of
Treasury, and Fred Goldberg, Commissioner of the IRS, both testified and
answered questions.23 3 The Subcommittee questioned neither Gideon nor
Goldberg on his views regarding a ban on retroactive regulation, despite the
clear substantive tax expertise of each.
Retroactivity was mentioned in the later testimony of the Chairman
for the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants234 who indicated
the AICPA's "strong support" 235 for a reform that would protect taxpayers
from retroactive rulemaking.23 6 The Tax Executives Institute, a professional
association who, at the time of the hearings, consisted of 4,700 individuals
who work primarily in large corporations,23 7 submitted comments to the
Subcommittee suggesting that the goals underlying the "good faith reforms"
listed in the press release would be advanced if Congress made statutes
effective only after regulations had been finalized, particularly in instances
"when [sic] broad grants of authority are given to the Treasury Department
to promulgate [these] regulations."23 8
Thus, as of July 1991, it appeared that representatives of the U.S.
govemment-e.g. the Administration and IRS-had not expressed their
views on banning retroactive regulation. Nonetheless, in November 1991,
Senator Pryor announced that "in the coming month [he] plan[ned] to
232. 1991 House Hearings,supra note 215, at 11.

233. Id. at 311-17, 323-54.
234. Id. at 441 (statement of AICPA Chairman).
235. Id. "This is a very important issue which the AICPA strongly
supports." Id.
236. "We commend the Subcommittee for its consideration of a reform that
would provide protection for taxpayers who make "good faith efforts" to comply
with the tax laws during the period between of enactment of the law and issuance of
clear guidelines and final regulations. Such a reform would recognize taxpayers'
[sic] needs for early guidance in complex areas of the tax law, while at the same time
stimulate the IRS and Treasury to accelerate for the issuance of such guidance." Id
237. See id. at 584 (statement of Timothy J. McCormally, Tax Counsel, Tax
Executives Institute). For more information about the Tax Executives Institute TEI,
see: http://www.tei.org/Pages/default.aspx.
238. 1991 House Hearings, supra note 215, at 587. The Institute referenced

and supported the Majority Tax Staff of the Ways and Means Committee's 1990
proposal to "make all rules and regulation[s] implementing broad guidelines
effective on a prospective-only basis," Id. at 587-88. This 1990 proposal was part of
a much larger proposal to simplify the tax system. The results of that effort were
published as STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 101ST CONG., WRITTEN
PROPOSALS ON TAX SIMPLIFICATION (Comm. Print 1990).
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introduce the taxpayer bill of rights 2 . .. .,,239 As one of eight examples of
reforms to be addressed, Senator Pryor stated that "all regulations issued by
the Treasury Department [should] be prospective unless expressly provided
otherwise by Congress," 2 40 and conveyed a strong belief that this was "one of
the critical elements of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2."241
On February 20, 1992,242 Senator Pryor officially introduced TBOR
2.243 The first version of what would become new section 7805(b) provided
that all regulations would "apply prospectively from the date of publication
of such regulation in the Federal Register." 2" The only exception to this
prohibition on retroactivity was that Congress could expressly authorize the
Secretary to issue certain regulations retroactively. 24 5
On the following day, hearings were held before the Senate Finance
Committee Subcommittee on Private Retirement Plans and Oversight of the
IRS. 2 46 The U.S. government finally expressed its opinions about reforms
that would ban retroactive regulation in the absence of express Congressional

239. 137 CONG. REc. 30,415 (1991) (statement of Sen. Pryor).
240. Id.
241. 138 CONG. REc. 2822-23 (1992). He continued: "It is almost
unimaginable . . . that we have an agency of the U.S. Government, the Internal

Revenue Service, that has the authority and the power to issue regulations that apply
retroactively. But the Internal Revenue Service does it all the time. We are going to
eliminate that authority." Id. The summary description of the proposals (hereinafter
Summary Proposal)for the Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 stated that:
T2 will generally require that all regulations issued by the
Treasury Department to implement broad legislative guidelines be
effective prospectively from the date of issuance in final,
temporary or proposed form. To keep such a presumption from
providing shelter for abusive transaction, and to provide for
administration of tax laws in the interim between the effective date
of a statute and the effective date of the associated regulations,
taxpayers would be deemed to have satisfied the necessary
requirements if they made a good-faith effort to utilize a
reasonable interpretation of the statute that resulted in substantial
compliance. This general rule requiring that regulations be
prospective could be superseded by a specific legislative grant
authorizing the Treasury Department to prescribe the effective date
of regulations with respect to statutory provision. 137 CONG. REC.
at 30,417.
242. See generally 1992 TBOR 2 Hearings,supra note 2.

243. 138 CONG. REc. 2822 (1992).
244. Id. at 2828 (1992).
245. Id. The material introduced by Senator Pryor restated the language of
the Summary Proposal verbatim. See 138 CONG. REC., supra note 241, at 1910.
246. See 1992 TBOR 2 Hearings,supra note 2.
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authorization. The Administration and the IRS both opposed the
prohibition. 24 7
Fred T. Goldberg, Jr., now-Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy for the
Department of the Treasury explained that "there are numerous situations
where the retroactive application of regulations is a substantial benefit to
taxpayers." 2 4 8 For instance, retroactive regulations promote consistency249
and can operate to "protect the taxpayer" 25 0 rather than leaving her "to the
mercy of individual revenue agent[s] or IRS employee[s]," 25 I each of whom
might have different interpretations of the law.
Yet, Mr. Goldberg seemed most gravely concerned that the ban
would greatly weaken the IRS's power to respond to aggressive taxpayer
behavior:
If the IRS is precluded from asserting positions
retroactively in cases where taxpayers have taken
questionable positions, the tax system will lose an implicit
restraint. As a consequence, sophisticated taxpayers will
tend to take more aggressive positions and revenue will be
lost . . . .[T]he government should not be foreclosed from

issuing retroactive regulations in situations in which
sophisticated taxpayers have engaged in questionable
transactions with the knowledge that they are subverting the
*
Congressional purpose
in enacting a statutory provision. 252
In her prepared statement, Shirley D. Peterson, then-Commissioner
of the IRS, succinctly explained the IRS's reasons for opposing the
247. See id. at 121 ("The Administration opposes this provision on revenue
and policy grounds."). See also id. at 212 ("We [the Internal Revenue Service]
oppose this provision. We believe current procedures already address this concern.
Also, the provision would deny [the] IRS the ability to address attempted abuses of
the statutory provision by sophisticated taxpayers.").
248. Id. at 58.
249. "I would point out that there are situations where regulations by their
nature require choices. Some taxpayers may be benefitted[;] others may be harmed.
A consistent rule is in the system's best interest." Commissioner Peterson also
commented on uniformity, stating '[B]etween the time the statute is enacted and the
regulations are issued, one taxpayer will interpret the law one way, another taxpayer
will interpret it another way, and you may have 15 different approaches to the
application of that statute. You absolutely abolish uniformity between the date of
enactment of the statute and the date the regulations are issued if you go forward
with this provision." Id. at 59.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 122.
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prohibition of retroactive regulations, also focusing on how the ban would
"deny [the] IRS the ability to address attempted abuses of the statutory
provision by sophisticated taxpayers."253
Representatives of the Taxpayer Executive Institute,254 the American
Supply Association ("the not-for-profit national organization serving
wholesale distributors and their suppliers in the plumbing, heating, cooling
and industrial and mechanical pipe, valves and fittings industries"), 2 5 5 and
the National Association of Enrolled Agents (a professional organization
consisting of members sanctioned by Congress to represent taxpayers) 256
filed statements expressing their support of the prohibition on retroactive
regulation.257
In March 1992, a conference agreement was reached which included
an exception to the presumption of retroactivity, permitting the Treasury to
"issue retroactive temporary or proposed regulations to prevent abuse of the
statute."25 8 Two versions of TBOR 2 incorporating the amended section
7805(b) passed both Houses of Congress in 1992, but each bill was vetoed
by President George H. W. Bush for reasons unrelated to the legislation.2 59
From 1992 until 1996, when TBOR 2 was signed into law, the
House of Representatives and Senate proposed various versions of what
would become new section 7805(b). Each of these proposals generally
prohibited retroactive regulation, but included an exception that allowed
regulations to "apply retroactively to prevent abuse of the statute to which
the regulation relates."26 0
In 1996, the final version of TBOR 2 passed unanimously through
both the House of Representatives and the Senate.26 1 President Bill Clinton

253. Id. at 212
254. See 1992 TBOR 2 Hearings, supra note 2, at 244 (statement of
Timothy J. McCormally, Tax Counsel, Tax Executives Institute).

255. http://www.asa.net//About-ASA.aspx.
256. http://www.naea.org/.
257. Other professional organizations filed statements but did not discuss
the retroactive prohibition.
258. See H.R. REP. No. 102-460, 102d. Cong., 2d. Sess. (1992)
(accompanying H.R. 4210).
259. 142 CONG. REc. 17,371 (1996) (statement of Sen. Pryor, explaining
that TBOR 2 "passed Congress twice that year, [but] . . . was ultimately vetoed

because it was included as part of two large tax bills with which President Bush did
not agree.").
260. See, e.g. Revenue Act of 1992, 102 H.R. 11, § 5803 (1992) (containing
language alluded to in H.R. REP. NO. 102-460, at 380); 104 S. 258, § 903 (1996).
261. 142 CONG. REc. 17,371 (1996) (Statement of Sen. Pryor) ("In making
its way to the Senate, [TBOR 2] passed the House of Representatives by a
unanimous 425 to 0 vote. I applaud the action of the House of Representatives, and I
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signed TBOR 2 into law on July 30, 1996.262 This final version of section
7805(b) contained an abuse exception that allowed the Treasury Secretary to
"provide that any regulation may take effect or apply retroactively to prevent
abuse."263
It is therefore clear that section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception was a
direct response to the concerns expressed by the Administration and IRS that
a flat ban on retroactive regulation would compromise the Treasury and
IRS's ability to adequately respond to egregious tax positions, especially
those taken by sophisticated taxpayers seeking to subvert the purposes of the
Code. This history strongly suggests that Congress intended to grant
Treasury substantial leeway to interpret this exception. This argument
becomes even stronger once one considers the specialized expertise
possessed by the employees of Treasury and the IRS.
3.

Agency Expertise

When determining whether Congress intended to delegate a certain
power to an agency, courts have considered whether that agency possesses
special expertise to exercise that authority. 264 As Justice Marshall wrote in
Martin v. OccupationalSafety and Health Review Commission,265

"Because historical familiarity and policymaking expertise
account in the first instance for the presumption that
Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the

am proud that this Thursday, because of a strong bipartisan coalition, the Senate has
now followed suit by unanimously passing taxpayer bill of rights 2.").
262. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996).
263. Id. at 1468, § 1101, codified at I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3).
264. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE

L.J. 1013, 1056 (1998) [hereinafter Sunstein, Agencies as Common Law Courts]
("The central idea behind Chevron is that where underlying statutes are ambiguous,
Congress should be taken to have decided that agencies are in a better position to
make judgments about their meaning than are courts."). See also Rafael I. Pardo &
Kathryn A. Watts, The StructuralExceptionalism of Bankruptcy Administration, 60

UCLA L. REv. 384, 423 (2012) ("Administrative law teaches that broad delegations
of policymaking power to agencies may well be desirable--and, hence, will generally
be tolerated as a constitutional matter--because of a variety of functional
considerations relating to agencies' institutional structures and capacities. These
functional considerations include the expertise that many agencies enjoy in
specialized areas of the law . . . .").

265. 499 U.S. 144 (1991). See also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 26667 (2006) (quoting the best actor rule articulated in Martin).
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agency rather than to the reviewing court . . . "6we
presume here that Congress intended to invest interpretive
power in the administrative actor in the best position to
develop these attributes.2 67
There are a large number of cases that have considered this factor.268
For instance, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon,269 the Court held that it "owe[d] some degree of deference" 270 to the
Secretary of the Interior's "reasonable interpretation" 271 of the Endangered
Species Act pointing, inter alia, to the "degree of regulatory expertise
necessary to" enforce that Act.272
By contrast, in Gonzales v. Oregon2 73 the Attorney General
interpreted the Controlled Substance Act to prohibit physicians from
prescribing legal medicine to terminally ill patients for the purpose of
committing suicide. The Supreme Court declined to apply deference to this
interpretation, believing it to be extremely unlikely that Congress would have
granted to the Attorney General the authority to make "quintessentially
medical judgments."274
Aside from the United States Tax Court, lower courts may hear at
most several tax cases a year. On the other hand, employees of Treasury and
the IRS possess tax-specific expertise and devote their daily attention to
issues of federal taxation law. "The IRS is engaged in extensive efforts to
266. Martin, 499 U.S. at 153 (citing Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers' Comp. Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 159, 108 S. Ct. 427, 440, 98 L. Ed.2d 450
(1987); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566, 100 S. Ct. 790, 797;
INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72, 89 S. Ct. 1519, 1525, 23 L. Ed.2d 101 (1969)).
267. Id.

268. In addition to the cases discussed, see, e.g., Nat'1 Cable & Telecomm.
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services et al., 545 U.S. 967, 1002-03 (2005) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("The questions the Commission resolved in the order under review
involve a 'subject matter [that] is technical, complex, and dynamic.' The
Commission is in a far better position to address these questions than we are.
Nothing in the Communications Act or the Administrative Procedure Act makes
unlawful the Commission's use of its expert policy judgment to resolve these
difficult questions." (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n, Inc. v. Gulf Power Co.,
534 U.S. 327, 339 (2002))).

269. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
270. Id. at 703-04.
27 1. Id.
272. Id. "The latitude the ESA gives the Secretary in enforcing the statute,
together with the degree of regulatory expertise necessary to its enforcement,
establishes that we owe some degree of deference to the Secretary's reasonable
interpretation." Id.
273. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
274. Id. at 267.
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curb abusive tax shelter schemes and transactions," 275 and to identify and
respond to "tax avoidance" transactions as quickly as possible.2 76 Thus,
employees of Treasury (of which the IRS is part) are generally in the best
position to determine whether a transaction constitutes abuse of the Codefor instance, whether transactions, such as the COBRA transaction, result in
duplicated losses or produce other results that run against fundamental
principles of the tax law. Congress, in enacting section 7805(b)(3), was
certainly aware of these facts, creating further evidence that Congress
intended to trust Treasury (and not courts) with the authority to interpret tax
abuse under section 7805(b)(3).
Because it seems clear that Congress intended to grant Treasury
substantial leeway to interpret tax abuse, a Treasury Regulation's
interpretation of section 7805(b)(3) will generally satisfy Chevron's first
step.
Before turning to Chevron's second step, however, this Part will
discuss cases which seem to analyze Chevron Step 1 in a different manner.
4.

Even if Congress Intended Treasury to Interpret Tax Abuse,
Did Congress Unambiguously Foreclose any Particular
Interpretationofthat Term?

In Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
277
Corporation,
the Supreme Court held that the FDA's interpretation of an
ambiguous statutory term could not clear Chevron's first step. While
Congress intended to delegate interpretive authority to the FDA to interpret
the ambiguous language at issue, the Court found that Congress clearly did
not intend the FDA to adopt the particular interpretation it had.
Under this line of analysis, if a court were to find that Congress
unambiguously foreclosed Treasury's interpretation of section 7805(b)(3)'s
abuse exception--e.g. if a court found that Congress clearly did not intend
Treasury to interpret COBRA transactions as an abuse of the Code-then
that interpretation would fail Chevron Step 1, and regulations enacted

275. EP ABUSIVE TAX TRANSACTIONS, http://www.irs.gov/RetirementPlans/EP-Abusive-Tax-Transactions.
276. Id. "The parties who participate in listed transactions may be required
to disclose the transaction as required by the regulations, register the transaction with
the IRS, or maintain lists of investors in the transactions and provide the list to the
IRS on request." Id.
277. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). For further discussion of this case, see generally
Sunstein, Agencies as Common Law Courts, supra note 264. See also Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, supra note 174, at 240-42.

Tax Abuse According to Whom?

2013]

47

retroactively in reliance on that interpretation could only apply
prospectively. 278
Because Congress failed to define "abuse," one might naturally
wonder how a court could find that Congress unambiguously foreclosed any
particular interpretation of tax abuse. This Part identifies two factors to guide
this inquiry.
a.

How Does the InterpretationFit Within the
Statutory Scheme?

In Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
27 9
Corporation,
the Supreme Court assessed the Food and Drug
Administration's (FDA's) interpretation of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act grants the FDA "the authority to
regulate, among other items, 'drugs' and 'devices."' 2 80 The Food and Drug
Administration had long maintained that it did not have jurisdiction to
regulate tobacco products. Years later, however, it changed this position and
issued regulations related to those goods. In the Federal Register, the Food
and Drug Administration claimed authority to do so by interpreting nicotine
to be a "drug" and cigarettes and smokeless tobacco to constitute "drug
delivery devices." 2 8 1 The Court found this regulation could not pass
Chevron's first step because Congress clearly did not intend the FDA to
interpret these ambiguous terms (i.e. "drug" and "drug delivery device") in
this way.
In so finding, the Court parsed through the legislative history of the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as well as "the tobacco related legislation that
Congress ha[d] enacted over . . . the 35 years" 282 preceding the decision.
Reaching as far back as 1929, the Court chronicled the various instances in
which Congress declined to grant the FDA jurisdiction over tobacco
products. 2 83 It also discussed the various pieces of tobacco-related legislation
that Congress enacted "against the backdrop of the FDA's consistent and
repeated statements that it lacked authority under the FDCA to regulate

tobacco. . ..

284

278. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
279. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). For further discussion of this case, see generally
Sunstein, Agencies as Common Law Courts, supra note 264. See also Sunstein,
Chevron Step Zero, supra note 174, at 240-42.

280. 529 U.S. at 126.
281. Id. at 127 (citing 61 Fed. Reg. 44418 (1996)).
282. Id. at 143.
283. Id. at 137-40.
284. Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 144 (2000).
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The Court also emphasized the importance of a contextual analysis
of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,2 85 examining not just the provision of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act that defined the FDA's authority, but
"viewing the FDCA as a whole."28 6 The Court found that if the FDA were to
have jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes, other provisions of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act would require that cigarettes be removed from the
market.287 Because Congress had "foreclosed the removal of tobacco
products from the market" in other legislation,28 8 the Court concluded that
Congress could not have intended the FDA to interpret their jurisdiction in a
way that overrode that result.289
In the 2001 decision, Whitman v. American Trucking Associations

Inc.,290 the Supreme Court used similar tools of statutory construction to
determine whether the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's)
interpretation of the Clean Air Act (CAA) satisfied Chevron Step 1.291 The
CAA required the Administrator of the EPA to set air quality standards at a
level that was "requisite to protect the public health."292 In making these air
quality calculations, the EPA claimed it could consider the costs that
industries would incur in complying with the applicable standards.
The Court looked at the CAA as a whole and found that air quality
standards were "the engine that [drove] nearly all of . .. the CAA." 293 The
Court therefore found it unlikely that Congress intended to delegate to the
EPA the authority to interpret these standards in the way it had. "Congress,"
the Court wrote "does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory
scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions." 294
Thus, when determining whether Congress clearly foreclosed
Treasury's interpretation of section 7805(b)(3), courts should look
holistically at how that interpretation fits within the Code. To illustrate,
285. Id. at 132 ("The meaning-or ambiguity-of certain words or phrases
may only become evident when placed in context.").
286. Id. at 133.
287. Id. at 137.
288. Id.
289. Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 137 (2000).
290. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
291. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 481. "We cannot agree with the Court of
Appeals that Subpart 2 clearly controls the implementation of revised ozone
NAAQS . . . because we find the statute to some extent ambiguous. We conclude,

however, that the [EPA]'s interpretation goes beyond the limits of what is
ambiguous and contradicts what in our view is quite clear. We therefore hold the
implementation policy unlawful." Id. (citations omitted).
292. Id. at 465 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).
293. Id. at 458.
294. Id at 468.
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Regulation section 1.752-6 held that transactions such as the COBRA
transaction abused the Code. As the government argued in the cases
discussed in Section III, this interpretation is consistent with other anti-abuse
provisions of the Code. The COBRA transactions were similar to the Coltec
transaction to which Congress responded in section 358. Further, the
COBRA transactions would likely have been deemed abusive under other
sections of the Code. Finally, section 358(h) might have been rendered
"impotent"2 95 without Regulation 1.752-6. Thus, far from "alter[ing] the
fundamental details" 2 9 6 of the Code, it appears that Regulation section 1.7526's interpretation of section 7805(b)(3) actually complemented and enforced
other provisions of the tax laws.
b.

The Importance of the Question Presented

In a seminal article, Justice Breyer suggests that courts "[a]sk
whether the legal question [an agency interpretation addresses] is an
important one" 297 [since] "Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and
answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer
themselves in the course of the statute's daily administration."29 8
Thus, in Brown & Williamson,299 discussed above, the Court found
that a decision to prohibit the marketing of tobacco products (the result of
granting the FDA the jurisdiction it claimed) was one of great "economic and
political significance."30 0 The Court, therefore, felt "confident that Congress
could not have intended to delegate [this decision] to an agency in so cryptic
a fashion."3 0'
The Court also looked at the importance of the questions presented
in other cases, such as MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Company302 (MCI) and Gonzales v. Oregon.303 In
MCI, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) claimed that because
the Communications Act of 1934 gave it authority to "modify any
requirement" of that Act, the FCC could completely eliminate the

295. United States v. Sala, United States' Supplemental Brief. supra note
138, at 9.
296. Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
297. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 370 (1986).
298. Id. (cited in Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
299. 529 U.S. 120.
300. Id. at 147.
301. Id. at 160.
302. 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
303. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
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requirement that long distance carriers file their rates. 304 The Court found it
"highly unlikely that Congress would leave the determination of whether an
industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rate-regulated to agency
discretion-and even more unlikely that it would achieve that through such a
subtle device as permission to 'modify' rate-filing requirements."30 s
In Gonzales,o6 the Supreme Court held that the Attorney General did
not have the authority to interpret the Controlled Substance Act to prohibit
physicians from prescribing legal medicine to terminally ill patients for the
purpose of committing suicide. The Court found the "issue of physicianassisted suicide [to be] the subject of an 'earnest and profound debate' across
the country." 3 07 The Court therefore found it unlikely that Congress would
have delegated to the Attorney General the authority to resolve that issue. 0 s
Thus, when determining whether Congress foreclosed Treasury's
interpretation of section 7805(b)(3), courts might also look at the importance
of the question that the interpretation would purport to resolve. It is unlikely
that many of the questions addressed by Treasury would have the same
"economic and political significance",309 as the questions presented in Brown
& Williamson and Gonzales. Nonetheless, there certainly may be situations
in which Treasury's retroactive application of a regulation implicates a
"major" issue of taxation law.
In fact, with respect to Regulation section 1.752-6, had Congress not
already decided through its enactment of section 358 that contingent
liabilities reduced a transferee's basis in the transferor-corporate stock
received in a section 351 exchange, Regulation section 1.752-6, which
provided for the same adjustments in partnership exchanges, may have been
seen to resolve a "major" question of taxation law. As it were, however,
Regulation section 1.752-6 simply extended section 358's requirements,
which applied to certain section 351 corporate transactions to analogous
partnership transactions. Thus, the questions resolved in Regulation section
1.752-6 seem far closer to the interstitial questions that Congress generally
intends agencies to answer.
In sum, by considering how the Treasury Department's interpretation
of "abuse" fits (or fails to fit) with the other provisions of the Code and the
importance of the question the interpretation purports to resolve, courts can
come to an informed conclusion about whether Congress foreclosed
Treasury's interpretation of section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception (and thus
304. MCI, 512 U.S. at 221.
305. Id. at 231.
306. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243.
307. Id. at 267.
308. Id
309. Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 147 (2000)
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whether that interpretation can withstand scrutiny under Brown &
Williamson's formulation of Chevron Step 1).
B.

Applying Chevron Step 2 to Treasury's Interpretations of Section
7805(b) (3)

If Treasury's interpretation of section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception
clears Chevron's first step, it should be upheld so long as it is a "permissible
construction" 310 of section 7805(b)(3) that is not "arbitrary, capricious or
manifestly contrary to"31 the plain language of the statute.
1.

Is Treasury'sInterpretationof Tax Abuse within the
Range ofPermissible Choices?

In applying Chevron Step 2, the Supreme Court asks whether the
interpretation chosen by the agency issuing the regulation is in the range of
permissible alternatives.3 12 While this standard is high, it is "not necessarily
insurmountable." 1 For instance, in Raponos v. United States3 14 the Supreme
Court considered the validity of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (Corps)
interpretation of the Clean Water Act (CWA), which prohibits pollution of
"navigable waters."31 1 "Navigable waters" is defined in the CWA to include
"the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."3 16 While the
Corps initially interpreted "waters of the United States" to include only those
waters that are "'navigable in fact' or readily susceptible of being rendered
so,"317 it later adopted a far more expansive definition which included "[a]ll

310. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
311.Id. at 844.
312. See, e.g., Raponos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 731-32 (2006). "We
need not decide the precise extent to which the qualifiers 'navigable' and 'of the
United States' restrict the coverage of the [Clean Water] Act. Whatever the scope of
these qualifiers, the [Clean Water Act] authorizes federal jurisdiction only over
'waters.' 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The only natural definition of the term 'waters,' our
prior and subsequent judicial constructions of it, clear evidence from other
provisions of the statute, and this Court's canons of construction all confirm that 'the
waters of the United States' in § 1362(7) cannot bear the expansive meaning that the
[U.S. Army Corps of Engineers] would give it." Id.
313. Lederman, Fighting Regs, supra note 26, at 697 (citing Judulang v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 479 (2011)).
314. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
315. Id. at 723.
316. Id.
317. Raponos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723 (2006).
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interstate waters including interstate wetlands."3 18 The Supreme Court found
that,
[t]he only natural definition of the term 'waters,' our prior
and subsequent judicial constructions of it, clear evidence
from other provisions of the [CWA], and this Court's canons
of construction all confirm that 'the waters of the United
States' cannot bear the expansive meaning that the Corps
would give it.3 19
Instead, the Court found that the term "waters of the United States"
could only be interpreted to include "relatively permanent, standing or
continuously flowing bodies of water" and did not include "channels through
which water flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that
periodically provide drainage for rainfall." 3 20 As a result, the Court held that
interpreting "waters of the United States" to include wetlands was not "based
on a permissible construction of the statute."
Thus, in determining whether Treasury had adopted a "permissible
construction" of section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception, courts would apply a
very similar analysis as the one described in Section IV(A)(4), asking
whether Congress had unambiguously foreclosed any particular
interpretation of "tax abuse." In other words, the analysis at Chevron Step 2
might be seen to "fold in" on the inquiry used by the Brown & Williamson
Court at Chevron Step 1, an effect observed by prominent administrative law
scholars.322 Regardless of whether the inquiry falls at Chevron Step 1 or 2, if
Treasury enacts a retroactive regulation which interprets section 7805(b)(3)'s
abuse exception in a way which permits too great an alteration to current tax
laws, courts should not hesitate to invalidate that regulation. The
318. Id. at 724.
319. Id. at 731-32.

320. Id. at 739.
321. Id.

322. See Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only
One Step, 95 VA. L. REV 597, 599 (2009) "Step One is therefore nothing more than a
special case of Step Two, which implies that all Step One opinions could be written
in the language of Step Two. Consider, as an example, FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco, in which the Supreme Court struck down the FDA's assertion of statutory
jurisdiction over tobacco products. The Court reached this conclusion under Step
One, asserting that Congress had expressed an intention on the 'precise question' of
whether the FDA could regulate tobacco. It would have been equally easy, however,
for the Court to find under Step One that the full scope of the FDA's statutory
jurisdiction is ambiguous . . . but to declare that the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction
over tobacco products was unreasonable under Chevron Step Two, for precisely the
same reasons the Court advanced in the actual opinion." Id. at 599-600.
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interpretation of abuse found in the preamble of Regulation 1.752-6,
however, would not seem to come close to doing so.
2.

Chevron Step 2 as "HardLook" Review

When reviewing agency rules under the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA), courts must determine whether the agency action was "arbitrary
or capricious. ... 323 In this context, a court reviews the process by which
the agency arrived at the rule, sometimes referred to as "hard look"
review.324 This review process was articulated in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company:32 5
the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation for its action including a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made." . .
. In reviewing that explanation, we must consider whether
the decision was based on a "consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment." . . . Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary
and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence
before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
,,326
expertise.
Although the Supreme Court has not formally adopted this processfocused formulation in determining whether an agency interpretation is
"arbitrary and capricious" under Chevron Step 2, it seems to have equated

323. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
324. See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposinga Placefor Politics in Arbitrary and

Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, n.1 (2009). ("The term 'hard look' review
developed in the D.C. Circuit as a judicial gloss on the meaning of the APA's
arbitrary and capricious test.") (citing Matthew Warren, Active Judging: Judicial
Philosophy and the Development of the HardLook Doctrine in the D.C. Circuit, 90

GEO. L.J. 2599 (2002)).
325. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
326. Id. at 43 (citing Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
83 S. Ct. 239, 9 L. Ed.2d 207 (1962); Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, 419 U.S. 281, 285, 95 S. Ct. 438, 442 (1974); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S. Ct. 814, 823 (1971)).
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327

the two inquiries in dicta. Furthermore, the Federal Circuit recently found
that a Treasury Regulation was an impermissible interpretation of the Code
under Chevron's second step because, inter alia, it "violate[d] the State Farm

requirement that Treasury provide a reasoned explanation for adopting a
regulation."328
For Treasury's interpretation of the abuse exception within section
7805(b)(3) to survive this alternative formulation of Chevron Step 2,
Treasury must engage in deliberate efforts to distinguish "abusive" from
"non-abusive" transactions and show this analysis in the Federal Register,
explaining its rationale for concluding that a particular transaction (or set of
transactions) constitutes abuse. To illustrate, Treasury might have bolstered
its analysis in the preamble of Regulation section 1.752-6 by incorporating
the strong arguments advanced by the Department of Justice in the Son-ofBoss litigation described in Section IV. Treasury might have, for example,
stated that Regulation section 1.752-6 was necessary to prevent abuse for the
following reasons:
*
The transaction addressed by Regulation
section 1.752-6 is the partnership analogue to the Coltec
transaction to which Code section 358 responds, and without
it, section 358 would be rendered "impotent." 32 9
*
"Abuse" should be interpreted broadly like
the other anti-abuse provisions found in the Code and
Regulations. In fact, it is likely that COBRA transactions
also violate some of these rules.330
*
"Abuse" is not synonymous with a lack of
economic substance. "Statutes can be operated so as to
produce various types of abuse" to the point where the
327. But see Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 476 n.7 (2011). ("The
Government urges us instead to analyze this case under the second step of the test we
announced in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., . . .
to govern judicial review of an agency's statutory interpretations. . . . Were we to do
so, our analysis would be the same, because under Chevron step two, we ask whether
an agency interpretation is "arbitrary or capricious in substance."') (citing Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L.
Ed.2d 694 (1984)).
328. Dominion Resources Inc. v. United States, 681 F.3d 1313, 1319
(2012).
329. United States v. Sala, United States' Supplemental Brief. supra note
138, at 9.
330. See generally In re COBRA Tax Shelters Litigation, M.D.L. Docket
No. 1727, United States Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Opposition to
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to the Validity of Treasury
Regulation 1.752-6 (S.D. Ind.) (Apr. 21, 2008).
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Treasury is "engaged in a perpetual game of catch up with
the innovative geniuses" who seek to subvert the tax system
and Congressional intent."' In light of this known
environment, Congress intended "abuse" to be defined
expansively when enacting section 7805(b)(3).
In addition to looking at Treasury's analytical process, courts
applying this "hard look" version of Chevron's second step might look at the
circumstances under which the retroactive regulation has been promulgated.
For instance, Professor Leandra Lederman has suggested that if a regulation
is promulgated in the course of (or in anticipation of) litigation-as
retroactive regulations may relatively often be-courts should consider
whether this timing "reflect[s] opportunism rather than careful application of
the agency's expertise." 33 2
VI.

CONCLUSION

Before 1996, Treasury had broad authority to regulate retroactively.
In 1996, however, this authority was dramatically curtailed. As part of the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, section 7805(b) prohibited Treasury from issuing
retroactive regulations unless certain exceptions were met. Section
7805(b)(3) allows a regulation issued by Treasury to operate retroactively "to
prevent abuse."333 But Congress failed to explicitly define "abuse" or
designate to any specific actor the power to do so.
Generally, when an agency interprets the statute it is entrusted to
administer-such as when Treasury interprets section 7805(b)(3) of the
Code-that interpretation is entitled to some level of deference. However,
courts that have analyzed whether a Treasury Regulation may operate
retroactively to prevent abuse used administrative law principles recently
rejected by the Supreme Court in Mayo Foundationv. United States.3 34 This
Article provides the first comprehensive look at the level of deference owed
Treasury's interpretation of section 7805(b)(3)'s abuse exception after Mayo.
This analysis offers a significant contribution. Granting Treasury
some power to issue retroactive regulations can help police and prevent the
most egregious tax transactions. However, case law suggests that the courts
and Treasury have very different interpretations of the Code's abuse
exception. The fate of future retroactive tax regulations may, therefore, turn
largely on which actor possesses the primary authority to define tax abuse.
331. Internal Revenue Service v. CM Holdings, Inc., 254 B.R. 578, 624 (D.
Del. 2000), aff'd, 301 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2002).
332. Lederman, FightingRegs, supra note 26, at 698.

333. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3) (2006).
334. 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011).

56

FloridaTax Review

Vol. 15:1

VOLUME 15

NUMBER 2

2014

FLORIDA
TAX
REVIEW
ARTICLES

THE UNRULY

A

WORLD

OF TAX:

PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
TAX COOPERATION FORUM

H. David Rosenbloom
Noam Noked
Mohamed S. Helal

EQUITY IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX

PREFERENCES FOR PENSIONS: CAPPING
THE AMOUNT ALLOWABLE IN TAXPREFERENCED RETIREMENT PLANS

Norman P Stein
John A. Turner

F

UNIVERSITY of

FLORIDA

Levin College of Law

taxanalySIS

